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Foreword 
 
During its review, the Sub-Committee chose to focus on a broad range of issues as 
part of the process of accountability of Government agencies to Parliament. This 
accountability is particularly important in light of the major transitions that the 
Australian Defence Organisation is currently undergoing, and the Sub-Committee 
takes this responsibility very seriously. 
During the period under review, Australia announced that it would be 
withdrawing its combat presence from Afghanistan and the process of 
transitioning responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces commenced. 
This process occupied a large part of the Committee’s attention during this review, 
as it is vital that Australian forces are successful in doing all they can to ensure an 
orderly and organised drawdown of operations in Afghanistan. 
Efforts at ensuring the highest possible level of force protection are also examined 
in this review. The Sub-Committee found that Defence has been active in this area, 
and further is seeking to strengthen this capability. However, as Australia draws 
down its presence in Afghanistan, Defence will have to remain vigilant that there 
is no deterioration in this capability. The Sub-Committee resolves to maintain a 
focus on this issue into the future. 
Also during the period under review, seven key reviews of Defence culture were 
conducted and finalised. These reviews examined a wide range of cultural issues 
within the Australian Defence Organisation, from the allegations of abuse at the 
Australian Defence Force academy to treatment of women in the civilian and 
uniformed wings of Defence, through to the use of alcohol and social media. The 
Sub-Committee examined these reviews, and found that there may be a lack of 
clarity as to what allegations fall within the scope of the DLA Piper Review. As 
such, it recommends that the Government seek to have this situation remedied. 
The Defence budget was examined as a part of the review. The Sub-Committee 
found that, while Defence reports on its budget in a variety of places and contexts, 
Defence’s budget needs to be reported on in greater detail in the Annual Report, 
particularly as it relates to the impact of declining budgets on capability 
acquisition and sustainment. 
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As with previous reviews, the Sub-Committee sought an update on progress in 
implementing the Strategic Reform Program (SRP). Defence appears to be tracking 
well against the original targets set out in the 2009 Defence White Paper, and against 
the particular targets set for the 2011-2012 financial year. Additionally, the Sub-
Committee notes that Defence has partially implemented its recommendation 
from the Review of the Defence Annual Report 2010-2011 that it include a discrete 
section on the SRP in annual reports. While this is a positive development, the 
Sub-Committee would still like to see this section expanded to include greater 
detail in future annual reports. 
The Sub-Committee examined three other issues in this review. Firstly it looked at 
Defence reporting generally, noting that reporting tends to be relatively light on 
detail and overly optimistic. As a result, the Sub-Committee recommends that 
Defence enhance its annual reporting by: 
• Developing a more precise method for reporting performance on 
capabilities acquisition and sustainment, which would detail: 
 Specific performance targets; 
 how performance is assessed in relation to these targets; and 
 the specific reasons why targets are, or are not, achieved;  
• Including some detail on emerging areas of concern and potential future 
issues; 
• Enhancing its reporting on the Defence budget and its implications for 
capabilities acquisition and sustainment; 
• Undergoing a periodic review conducted by independent experts, similar 
to the United States’ Quadrennial Defense Review; and 
• Including information on operational readiness.   
Second, the Sub-Committee looked briefly at parliamentary engagement with the 
Australian Defence Force. In order to further strengthen parliamentary oversight 
of Defence, the Committee also made a third recommendation: that the 
Parliamentary Defence Engagement Program, currently used to place 
parliamentarians with ADF units, be extended to include policy areas within the 
Department of Defence, as well as the Defence Materiel Organisation. 
Finally, the Committee received an update on the Joint Strike Fighter project. The 
Sub-Committee was told that, since the recent re-baselining of the program, it has 
been tracking well towards delivering the required capability with an initial 
operating capability for Australia of around 2020.  
The Sub-Committee commends the service of the men and women of the ADF, 
and their contribution to disaster relief efforts and operations in support of 
Australia’s security around the globe. The Sub-Committee notes that, in 2013, 
Australia lost ten of its personnel on operations in Afghanistan. The Sub-
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Committee acknowledges their sacrifice, and our thoughts are with the families of 
these brave soldiers. 
 
 
Senator Mark Furner 
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Terms of reference 
 
 
Pursuant to paragraph 1 (b) of its resolution of appointment, the Joint Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade is empowered to consider and 
report on the annual reports of government agencies, in accordance with a 
schedule presented by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.1 
The Speaker’s schedule lists annual reports from agencies within the Defence and 
Foreign Affairs portfolios as being available for review by the Committee.2 
On 27 November 2012 the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Trade authorised the Defence Sub-Committee to review the Department of 
Defence Annual Report 2011-2012. 
 
 
1  Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Resolution of Appointment, 
viewed 24 May 2013, 
<www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Commi
ttees?url=jfadt/resoltn.htm>. 
2  Speaker’s Schedule, Allocation to Committees of Annual Reports of Departments, Agencies, 
Authorities and Companies, viewed on 24 May 2013 
<www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Commi
ttees#roles>. 
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5 Reviews of Defence Culture 
Recommendation 1 
The Committee recommends that the ‘Defence Abuse Reparation Scheme 
Guidelines’ and the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce terms of 
reference should be reviewed to clarify: 
 whether cases involving a complainant not employed by Defence 
fall within the scope of the relevant processes; and 
 what abuses are defined as in and out of scope, including whether 
abuses which constitute offenses under relevant Commonwealth 
legislation are included. 
6 Strategic Reform Program 
Recommendation 2 
The Committee recommends that the Defence Annual Report include 
detailed information on how savings are being achieved under each 
stream of the Strategic Reform Program. 
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7 Other issues 
Recommendation 3 
The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence enhance its 
public reporting by: 
 Developing a more precise method for reporting performance on 
capabilities acquisition and sustainment, which would detail: 
⇒ Specific performance targets; 
⇒ how performance is assessed in relation to these targets; and 
⇒ the specific reasons why targets are, or are not, achieved; 
 Including some detail on emerging areas of concern and potential 
future issues; 
 Enhancing its reporting on the Defence budget and its implications 
for capabilities acquisition and sustainment; 
 Undergoing a periodic review conducted by independent experts, 
similar to the United States’ Quadrennial Defense Review; and 
 Including information on operational readiness. 
Recommendation 4 
The Committee recommends that the Defence Parliamentary 
Engagement Program include placements with the Department of 
Defence policy areas and the Defence Materiel Organisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
1.1 During the 2011-2012 financial year, Defence continued to engage in 
military operations around the world, and to assist with disaster relief. 
1.2 The Australian Defence Force (ADF) worked towards ceasing operations 
in Solomon Islands and East Timor, and began the formal process of 
transitioning security responsibility to the Afghan National Security 
Forces in Afghanistan.1 
1.3 In addition to these operations, the ADF was also active in providing 
support to communities affected by natural disaster in Australia, as well 
as assisting in the protection of Australia’s borders.2 
1.4 In 2011-2012, Defence claimed to have generated more than $1 billion in 
savings through its Strategic Reform Program (SRP), now in its third year. 
This included reform of the way in which Defence managed and 
formulated its capital equipment budgets, and a number of important 
reforms to project management and accountability have been 
implemented.3 
1.5 Defence culture received considerable attention in 2011-2012, with a range 
of comprehensive reviews being completed on a number of issues within 
the Defence organisation, including sexual and other abuse, the treatment 
of women, the use of alcohol and the use of social media. As a result of 
these reviews, Defence has produced a strategy called Pathways to Change, 
which will form the basis for Defence’s addressing of the issues raised in 
the various reviews. 
 
1  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 3. 
2  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 3. 
3  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 4. 
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Annual Report review objectives and scope 
1.6 The review of the Defence Annual Report is an important task and an 
opportunity for the Defence Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade to inquire into a broad 
range of Defence issues as part of the process of accountability of 
Government agencies to Parliament. The Sub-Committee takes this 
responsibility very seriously. 
Focus areas 
1.7 The Sub-Committee decided to focus on five main areas for its review of 
the Defence Annual Report 2011-2012. These issues and their chapters are: 
 The drawdown and transition in Afghanistan – covered in Chapter 
Two; 
 Defence budget – covered in Chapter Three; 
 Force protection – covered in Chapter Four; 
 Reviews of Defence culture – covered in Chapter Five; and 
 The Strategic Reform Program – covered in Chapter Six. 
1.8 In its review of the Defence Annual Report 2010-2011, the Sub-Committee 
resolved to maintain a focus on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) project, with a 
view to ensuring that it provides the ADF with the necessary capabilities. 
As such, the Sub-Committee also gives a brief update on the progress of 
the JSF project with a particular focus on the issues of cost, schedule and 
capability in Chapter Seven, along with an account of the other issues that 
arose during the course of this review.  
Conduct of the review 
1.9 The Review was announced via media release on 29 November 2012. 
1.10 The Sub-Committee received five submissions; one from Mr James Brown 
and four from Defence answering questions on notice. These submissions 
were published on the Committee’s website, and are listed at Appendix A. 
1.11 The Sub-Committee held two public hearings and took evidence from the 
following witnesses: 
 Senior Defence officials – 15 March 2013; and 
 Mr James Brown and Defence officials involved in the JSF project – 16 
May 2013. 
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1.12 The proceedings of these hearings were webcast through the Parliament’s 
website, allowing interested parties to follow the proceedings as they 
occurred. 
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Drawdown of operations in Afghanistan  
2.1 This chapter outlines the changing role of the Australian Defence Force 
(ADF) in Afghanistan. It also discusses funding issues related to the 
drawdown, as well as support for returning veterans.   
Background  
2.2 Australia currently provides a military contribution to the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan under Operation 
SLIPPER.  Approximately 1,550 ADF personnel are based in Afghanistan.  
A further 830 personnel are located within the Middle East Area of 
Operations.     
2.3 The ISAF is now in a transition phase of the operation in Afghanistan and 
is handing over lead responsibility for security across Afghanistan to the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).   
2.4 As a part of this transition process, the current Australian operation in 
Afghanistan will cease at the end of December 2014.   
2.5 In the 2011-2012 financial year, Defence spent $1.066 billion on Operation 
SLIPPER.1 In terms of future funding, for 2012-13, Operation SLIPPER is 
estimated to cost approximately $1.2 billion, and this is expected to drop 
in the coming financial year to around $700 million. 
 
1  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 110. 
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Australia’s mission in Afghanistan post 2014 
2.6 Defence told the Committee that the nature of Australia’s involvement  in 
Afghanistan will change significantly after 2014,  noting that: 
The operation will be distinctly different post-2014 in that it will be 
primarily an advise, assist and train mission. To date, we have 
handled a lot of the combat load. That is changing now as we hand 
over responsibility to the ANSF. Certainly the next mission is 
really about advise, assist and train. Therefore, there is no combat 
load on the next force in a conventional sense as we have done in 
the past.2 
2.7 In addition, Defence stated that Australia’s mission in Afghanistan after 
2014 will involve sustaining and supporting the ANSF, as well as 
providing ongoing development assistance. 3 
Sustaining and supporting the ANSF 
2.8 Defence advised the Committee that Australian support for the ANSF 
after 2014 will involve training for Afghan National Army officers, stating 
that: 
The government has already agreed and stated that we will 
provide trainers to the Afghan National Army Officer Academy. 
That is being led by the United Kingdom military forces but we 
will be a significant contributor to that. We will start work on that 
in the third quarter of this year, in August or September, and we 
will provide that for quite a number of years until the Afghans are 
ready to take over that responsibility themselves.4 
2.9 The Committee queried what specific forms of training Defence will 
provide as part of this program. In response, Defence explained that the 
training will be focused on ‘developing the leadership skills at the junior 
and mid ranking officer level.‘5 
2.10 Defence added that ADF personnel will continue to be embedded in the 
ANSF headquarters that are established and advised that ‘that sort of 
command and control framework is being worked through at the present 
time.’6 
 
2  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 2. 
3  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 2. 
4  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 2. 
5  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 2. 
6  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 3. 
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2.11 Further, Defence commented that the ADF may also assist with special 
forces operations after 2014, commenting that: 
…we will look at providing assistance in the special forces 
operations tasks there, one of which could fall into the training of 
Afghan special forces, and then, if there is an appropriate mandate 
and a requirement to support, the government is prepared to 
consider providing a counter-terrorist force to continue to operate 
against al-Qaeda there.7 
2.12 However, Defence clarified that these decisions are ‘dependent on final 
NATO and government of Afghanistan decisions on what they typically 
want after 2014.’8 
2.13 Australian support for the ANSF after 2014 will also include contributions 
to an international sustainment fund. Defence observed that: 
…the government announced last year that it would provide $100 
million a year as our contribution to the sustainment of the ANSF 
for the first three years beyond the end of 2014. That is our 
contribution to an international sustainment fund of around $4 
billion a year to ensure that the ANSF has the numbers and the 
capability.9 
Development assistance  
2.14 Defence also noted that Australian development assistance to Afghanistan 
will increase after 2014:  
…after the end of 2014, the government has announced that we 
will have a significant development assistance program. We have 
a significant development assistance program in Afghanistan now, 
but for the three years beyond the end of 2014 it will be in the 
order of $200 million a year.10 
2.15 Due to these changes to the Australian mission in Afghanistan, Defence 
advised that the number of ADF personnel in Afghanistan will be 
reduced,  stating that: 
Beyond the end of 2014, probably the major Australian interaction 
with Afghan civilians will be via the government's development 
assistance program. That is a deliberate move.11 
 
7  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 3. 
8  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 3. 
9  Mr Richardson, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 3. 
10  Mr Richardson, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 3. 
11  Mr Richardson, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 10. 
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Resetting the ADF  
2.16 The Committee queried how Australia’s changing mission in Afghanistan 
after 2014 will affect the role and structure of the ADF. In response, 
Defence stated that there is a need to ‘reset’ the ADF post-Afghanistan: 
…it is not just post-Afghanistan. Obviously, we are pretty much 
done and dusted in East Timor. At the moment, there is only a 
handful of people over there doing the last bit of admin. We will 
be out of the Solomon Islands in about September and… there will 
be a substantial reduction in numbers over the coming year or so 
in Afghanistan.12 
2.17 Defence also highlighted the need to build on the experience gained by the 
ADF in Afghanistan, emphasising that:  
…as we look to reset the ADF on the comeback, one thing is the 
absorption of the right lessons at many levels—operational and 
tactical level—into the ADF so that we can continue. Afghanistan 
is not the only war; it is a form of warfare. We need to take those 
lessons where appropriate, and many of them do cross over to 
conventional operations in a broader sense.13 
2.18 In particular, Defence noted that training processes and command and 
control procedures are being revised to reflect the experience of the ADF 
in Afghanistan:  
We are rethinking and resetting our training and exercise 
programs to get better value for money out of them and to make 
sure they are being conducted in the right context and the right 
complexity. A lot of what we have learnt about fusion of 
information command and control and so forth is quite 
transferable into that space, so we need to do that.14 
2.19 Defence added that it is working to restore conventional capabilities that 
were limited by the operations in Afghanistan: 
We will also obviously be concentrating on the preparedness of 
the ADF to ensure that, across the board, some of our particular 
conventional skills such as anti-submarine warfare and so forth, 
which, to be frank, we have taken a dip in because the particular 
elements have been used elsewhere—the P3s for example—and 
differently will be running through our design.15 
 
12  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 3. 
13  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 3. 
14  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 3. 
15  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 3. 
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2.20 The Committee also asked Defence what measures were in place to 
maintain force readiness and mitigate the retirement of personnel after the 
drawdown in Afghanistan is complete. Defence responded that there is a 
need to continue to develop training and education programs for 
personnel:  
…we are looking at the construct of our employment offer to 
people to ensure that it reflects where we think the requirement is 
to attract, recruit and retrain people and also to make sure that the 
nature of the work they do builds on that experience—that is, if 
they come back and we are not training them, educating them and 
working them as they have seen on operations, then frankly they 
could say we are not serious and we will lose people.16 
2.21 Also, according to Defence there may be increased opportunities for 
personnel to participate in activities and exercises offshore after 2014: 
…we will be looking to do different types of activities with our 
friends throughout the region… So, there will be, I think, an 
increase in opportunity for people to participate in activates or 
exercises offshore. As we look at each of the countries that we 
have bilateral relationships with at the moment, we are reframing 
each of those relationships to make sure there is an appropriate 
level of interaction—discussions, talks and so forth, but also 
hands-on physical activities with each of those countries.17  
2.22 However, Defence acknowledged that some loss of personnel will occur 
after the drawdown is complete: 
But we will lose people—there is no doubt. We do not run wars to 
keep people in the Defence Force—quite the opposite; we keep 
them there to be ready if we need to go and do it. So we go back to 
where we were, in a general sense, post-Vietnam and have to 
really develop that training regime, the exercise regime and the 
professionalism in the organisation to maintain it there for the next 
time the ADF might be required to deploy.18 
Support for veterans  
2.23 An important facet of Australia’s withdrawal from Afghanistan is what 
happens to the defence personnel upon their return. It is vital that they 
 
16  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 3. 
17  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 9. 
18  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 3. 
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receive the proper support both in regard to transitioning from a wartime 
to a peacetime force, and in ensuring appropriate support for any physical 
or mental health issues they develop as a result of their service in 
Afghanistan. The care of wounded and injured soldiers is the subject of an 
inquiry by this Committee, and as a result this section focuses mostly on 
the mental health impacts on returning Defence personnel. 
Capacity of the ADF to support veterans 
2.24 Defence noted that it has been doing a lot in recent years to ensure that 
returning soldiers receive proper support and care for any mental health 
issues they may develop as a result of their service: 
If you look at what we have done over about the last three years in 
terms of programs to support wounded, injured and ill soldiers, I 
think we have done a very good job to put the framework into 
place to deal with the cases we have at hand and set ourselves up 
to deal with what might come in the future. I do see reports about 
tidal waves, or surges as you say, coming in. For post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), for example, we would expect the numbers 
to increase into the future because this syndrome takes time, for 
some people, to evolve. We have put resources into it. Following 
the Dunt review a few years back, the government put a 
significant amount of money into the resourcing. We have 
reframed the way we are regionally postured to assist people, 
going into much more multiskilled teams. We have established 
regional mental health care teams. We have instituted a lot of 
programs—from resilience to the other end.19 
2.25 However, Defence noted that sometimes it is difficult to determine which 
individuals are suffering from the effects of PTSD and similar disorders, as 
there is a reticence to come forward due to perceptions it could harm 
career prospects. Defence told the Committee that: 
As always, the issue is… that people need to come forward, and be 
urged and supported to come forward, to declare that they need 
assistance. I will say again on the public record that if people come 
forward and they are suffering they will be treated. There is no 
detriment to their career. But they need to accept their personal 
responsibility that they need to be able to do the job and I and 
their subordinates have got to have confidence in them to do the 
job as well. So hiding illness and putting your subordinates at risk 
is just as big a sin as me not providing you with the right support. 
 
19  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 4. 
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And I think people need to think that through: it is not just about 
me, it is about what their responsibilities are. I think that is a 
message which probably has not gone out strongly enough. And, 
should there be a tidal wave, I think we have got at least the 
foundation in place to be able to expand to deal with it. But, at the 
moment, I think the framework is appropriate. Let us watch and 
learn as the years go by.20 
2.26 While this is an issue in society more generally, Defence stated that this 
reticence to come forward posed them particular difficulties in identifying 
sufferers of PTSD: 
We often have very high-functioning people, who—not just in the 
military, but in all walks of life—do manage to conceal their 
symptoms and manage them to a point so that they continue to 
function. That is whether they continue to function in Afghanistan 
or in a high-powered civilian job. People use alcohol and people 
use drugs, but they hide it. What we really are trying to address is 
that there is an absolute responsibility for us in the health system 
to assist people. There is also an absolute responsibility within the 
command system to encourage their people, to look after their 
people, and to encourage them to seek help. But there is also a 
personal responsibility to admit that you have a problem.21 
2.27 Defence also informed the Committee that it was endeavouring to train 
commanders and soldiers to raise awareness about how to spot personnel 
who are potentially suffering from mental ill-health, and provide 
appropriate pathways for them to seek help for themselves or their 
colleagues: 
Again, there are a range of programs we have put in place in terms 
of suicide awareness training, suicide ideation and so forth. There 
are quite a number of 24/7 capacities for people to seek support 
and so forth. From our ab initio training at officer and soldier level 
and in our courses above that, awareness of what has happened to 
the force and going through the force I think is quite alive. If 
people front up with those sorts of issues, the capacity to move 
them pretty much into health care within hours exists. So I would 
be confident that if someone fronted up to an officer, a senior non-
commissioned officer or so forth and said, “Hey, I'm suffering 
from this,” they know what the contact points are—and if it is 
 
20  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 4. 
21  Rear Adm. Walker, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 12. 
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simply just marching them over to the health centre, that is the 
start point.22 
2.28 Specifically, Defence told the Committee that it runs a number of 
programs in this area: 
We have a number of training programs. We have some general 
suicide awareness training and we have some general mental 
health training. It is what we call the Keep Your Mates Safe 
Program—Keep Your Mates Safe-Alcohol and Keep Your Mates 
Safe-Suicide. It is about trying to give the peer group a bit more 
awareness about what to do. Particularly if someone is suffering a 
mental health condition, the individual, peers, command, and 
health all have a responsibility. If someone suggests that they are 
worried for a person’s safety from a mental health condition or 
any condition, you do not leave them. You ring 000, you ring 
command or you take them to the health centre. If they do not go, 
you do not leave them; you get someone else to talk to command.23 
2.29 The Committee explored the issue of the adequacy of the post-deployment 
screening process, and whether this was robust enough to deal with the 
health issues likely to arise as Australia withdraws its presence in 
Afghanistan. Defence assured the Committee that it is: 
…quite confident that we have invested appropriately and put in 
the framework to support the care and management of the 
wounded, injured and ill service men and women in the ADF, 
particularly in the mental health area. Some of our work in that 
space is world class. I know we all harbour concern that people 
can fall through the cracks or people do not identify. The 
framework is right. If you could get me a predictor of who will 
suffer mental health disorder, that would go a great way to help us 
probably be better than we are at the present time. But certainly 
we have not been sitting back to let this just develop around us... 
Over the last three years at least, there has been quite significant 
work to build that framework, looking at it on a continuum, from 
resilience training from day one to support and identification 
when you come back. The big loophole in all of that is if people do 
not self-identify and we cannot identify through the work 
environment or family reporting and so forth, they will stay out 
 
22  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, pp. 4-5. 
23  Rear Adm. Walker, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 13. 
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there until they either decide to do that, or they take some other 
sort of action.24 
2.30 Defence elaborated on the difficulties of using a pre-deployment screening 
process, and discussed the need to conduct regular screenings both during 
and after deployments: 
We do have those screening tools in place, but what we know 
from the evidence is that screening people prior to going on 
deployment is not beneficial. If they want to go, people will 
answer the questions because they want to go. What evidence does 
support is that when people return and we do that screening prior 
to them leaving the area of operation four to six months later, is 
that that is the time when people will be honest and tell us. That is 
why we have a screening program that is done post-deployment 
rather than pre-deployment. Every military in the world will say 
that the evidence of doing pre-deployment screening is not worth 
the paper that it is written on.25 
2.31 Then, Defence discussed the range of preparatory work it does with 
personnel to ensure, insofar as it is possible, that they are prepared for the 
situation that they will face on deployment: 
First of all, we screen people coming into the military. We do 
resilience training that starts off in the recruit schools and the 
initial officer school. It is about teaching people how to deal with 
stressful situations—how to manage them and how to react. In the 
beginning, it is about how you deal with leaving civilian life and 
coming into the military, coming into recruit school. It is testing 
and adjusting, discovering what tools are needed to adjust to that 
stressful situation. 
Then we do training pre-deployment. That is more about how you 
test and adjust in a stressful warlike combat operation. It is like a 
continuum. You are doing it through the different stages of a 
military career. It is also about trying to prepare people for what 
will happen on deployment. In the military there will be people 
who will see things and experience things that will affect not only 
their physical health but also their mental health.26 
2.32 Defence then informed the Committee of what it was doing in terms of 
post-deployment screening: 
 
24  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, pp. 7-8. 
25  Rear Adm. Walker, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 8. 
26  Rear Adm. Walker, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 8. 
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The screening tools that we do post-deployment, the RtAPS and 
the POPS—Return to Australia Psychological Screening and Post-
Operational Psychological Screen—are administered by 
psychologists. There is a scoring system, so if you meet the cut-off 
then either you go on for a medium assessment or early 
assessment or we will review you in a period of time. Then what 
we would do is consider whether they are put in to clinical 
psychologists for review or whether they are seen by the general 
practitioner for ongoing monitoring. There may be a decision for a 
psychiatric review, or there may be ongoing monitoring by the 
general practitioner. Again, because there is a spectrum of 
disorder and a spectrum of how people present, there are different 
ways that we will manage them.27 
Cooperation with the Department of Veterans Affairs 
2.33 A central part in providing appropriate care for the veterans of the conflict 
in Afghanistan is played by the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA). As 
such, Defence discussed a recent memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
it has signed with DVA which is designed to ensure that appropriate care 
and support is given to returned soldiers long term: 
What we are trying to do with DVA is ensure that there is a 
continuum in how we support people while they are currently 
serving and then, if they leave the military and they have a 
medical condition, when and how they transition. It is about 
ensuring that we have got our processes and our procedures all 
aligned. For example, there could be someone with a medical 
condition—and it is often mental health because that is often a 
little bit more difficult. It is about how we identify someone with 
that condition and give them appropriate treatment. They have a 
rehabilitation case manager in Defence appointed with the aim of 
either getting them back to work or into a different job that is still 
within the military or transitioning out because they are no longer 
available.28 
2.34 Alignment of goals for and programs of support between Defence and 
DVA is a central part of this MOU and of improving the continuity of care 
and support offered to veterans as they transition out of the ADF. Defence 
elaborated on this aspect at a public hearing: 
 
27  Rear Adm. Walker, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 13. 
28  Rear Adm. Walker, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 8. 
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If we are going to transition them, it is about looking at what we 
need to have in place as they transition. It is about ensuring that 
their DVA claim has been put in and is managed and in most cases 
accepted prior to discharge. It is about putting in place the medical 
support, so there has to be a case handover. If possible, we will 
hand over from the same treating person that they have had in 
Defence and that will continue once they leave, but if it is not 
possible then we make sure that handover is a positive handover 
of the facts to the new treating health provider. It is about looking 
at what are the rehabilitation goals, needs and programs that we 
might then transition. Perhaps previously we were a bit disjointed; 
it was what we did and then what DVA did, but they were not all 
aligned up. What we are trying to do now is for it to be all aligned 
as we move forward. So the patient or the member does not really 
see anything different. They are just going on their treatment 
program; it is just that one day they are in the military and the 
next day they have been discharged, but they have the same 
support, the same mechanisms, the same health support and the 
same rehab requirements and providers that they did when they 
were in the military.29 
2.35 In regard to the potential for individual veterans suffering from physical 
injuries or mental ill health to ‘slip through the cracks’ of the post-
deployment screening processes, Defence noted that it was attempting to 
use every opportunity to prevent this from happening, stating: 
We also use every engagement—if you go to medical for a 
vaccination or if you go for your annual medical. We use all of 
those opportunities to ask people how they are going. In the 
medicals, we look at alcohol screening and stress levels. We do 
give people the opportunities to engage... there is a personal 
responsibility for people to tell us there is a problem, and then we 
can help in the mental health space. I have said before that it is 
really hard to hide a broken leg, but it is easier to hide mental 
health conditions.30 
Care of ADF personnel wounded or injured on operations 
2.36 Concurrent with this review of the Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, the 
Committee has conducted an Inquiry into the Care of ADF Personnel 
Wounded and Injured on Operations.  For a deeper analysis of the issue of 
 
29  Rear Adm. Walker, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 8. 
30  Rear Adm. Walker, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 11. 
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support for veterans and the capacity of the ADF and DVA to support 
them, see the Inquiry report.31 
Defence materiel and equipment 
2.37 One of the major questions facing Defence during the withdrawal from 
Afghanistan is what to do with the important capabilities and materiel 
currently stationed in Afghanistan. The Committee questioned Defence as 
to what would happen to the equipment: 
If it is in workable order and so forth and repairable and 
maintainable back here in Australia we will bring it all back. So 
there is a massive effort in planning at the present time in terms of 
collapsing that camp and bringing everything back—from 
ammunition to vehicles, equipment and so forth. I anticipate that 
we will leave very little behind. Indeed, from the ISAF perspective 
and with the government of Afghanistan, we need to be very 
careful that we do not leave stuff behind that could be used with 
ill intent or leave kit behind for the Afghans which they simply 
cannot maintain. So our intent would be to bring everything back 
if we can.32 
Committee comment 
2.38 It is important that, as Australia withdraws its combat presence in 
Afghanistan, the legacy of Australia’s presence there be appropriately 
dealt with. In the Committee’s view, there are several aspects to this. 
2.39 First, the Committee believes it is important that the ANSF be provided 
with the appropriate support and assistance they need to maintain 
security in Afghanistan. This will require ongoing engagement from 
partner nations, including Australia, both in terms of training assistance, 
defence materiel and development assistance. The Committee is satisfied 
that Defence has a plan in this regard, and that this plan is as robust as 
possible. 
2.40 Second, it is vital that the transition of the ADF from a wartime force to a 
peacetime force be handled with as little disruption as possible. At the 
same time, it is important that the operational readiness of the ADF be 
 
31  Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Care of ADF Personnel 
Wounded and Injured on Operations, June 2013. 
32  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 3. 
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maintained to the highest extent possible. While the Committee is 
concerned at the potential for the loss of personnel once Australia’s 
presence in Afghanistan has been drawn down, it is confident that 
Defence is aware of the potential issues in this area and has a plan to 
manage these issues. 
2.41 Third, given the large number of uniformed personnel who have served 
on active duty in Afghanistan, one of the main challenges Defence will 
face over the next decade is making sure these veterans receive 
appropriate assistance and care. The Committee examines this matter 
further in its report for the inquiry into the care of soldiers wounded and 
injured on operations.   
 3 
 
Defence budget 
Introduction 
3.1 The Australian Defence Organisation is one of the largest government 
employers in Australia, and is responsible for employing more than 22,000 
public servants and 56,000 military personnel.1  
3.2 It is also responsible for a wide range of functions, including conducting 
military operations within Australia and internationally, disaster relief, 
planning for and delivering Australia’s military capabilities, and the day 
to day functioning of the Australian Defence Force (ADF).  
3.3 As a result, Defence has one of the largest budgets of any Australian 
government agency, with a total spend of $25.291 billion in 2011-2012.2 
The Annual Report 2011-2012 elaborated on this figure: 
This is an overspend of $170.9 million when compared to the 
revised estimate as at Portfolio Budget Statements 2012-13 after 
factoring in no-win/no-loss movements of $117.0 million. The 
budget overspend was funded by utilising carry forward 
appropriation from previous years. 
This is primarily a result of an overspend in operating costs 
($239.2 million) and an under-receipt in own-source revenue ($89.8 
million), offset by underspends in capital purchases ($138.5 
million) and employee costs ($19.5 million).3 
3.4 When reporting on its budget, Defence divides its activities into three 
outcomes. Outcome 1 accounted for the bulk of the Defence budget in 
 
1  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 285. 
2  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 9. 
3  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 9. 
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2011-2012, costing $22.047 billion. This outcome is focused on the 
maintaining Defence’s ‘capacity to support current commitments and 
future contingencies’, including through the provision of military 
capabilities and all of the ‘policy, command and support functions 
undertaken by the entire Defence organisation’.4  
3.5 Outcome 2 accounted for a further $958 million in 2011-2012. This 
outcome is focused on the conduct of military operations in support of 
Australia’s regional and global interests, and is split into two broad areas: 
operations in the immediate region and operations in support of wider 
interests.5 
3.6 Operations in the immediate region cost $176 million in 2011-2012. This 
involved Australian defence personnel being deployed to Solomon 
Islands, Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea and the island countries of the 
Southwest Pacific.6 
3.7 Operations in support of wider interests cost $782.66 million in 2011-2012. 
This mainly involved Australian defence personnel being deployed to 
Afghanistan, but also includes support for United Nations operations in 
the Middle East and Africa.7 
3.8 Outcome 3 accounted for $18.4 million in 2011-2012. According to the 
Annual Report, this outcome is focused on: 
…the security of the Australian coastline from illegal immigration, 
smuggling, quarantine evasion and other intrusions to Australian 
sovereignty, counter-terrorism responses, search and rescue, and 
natural disaster relief.8 
3.9 Specifically, this outcome involved the ADF:  
 supporting Border Protection Command through the provision of 
maritime surveillance assets;  
 the provision of assistance to flood affected communities in New South 
Wales, Queensland and Victoria; and 
 support for the security arrangements surrounding the October 2011 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting and the November 
2011 visit of US President Barack Obama.9 
 
4  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 31, 35. 
5  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, pp. 109-115. 
6  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, pp. 116-119. 
7  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, pp. 120-123. 
8  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 127. 
9  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 127. 
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3.10 This chapter will focus on the following selected areas of the Defence 
budget: 
 Budget cuts and their impact; 
 Reporting the Defence budget; and 
 The budgetary implications of operations both in Australia and 
overseas. 
Budget cuts 
3.11 While Defence’s funding increased by 4.2 per cent in the 2011-2012 
financial year, in the 2011-2012 budget the Government announced a 
significant cut to the Defence budget of $4.3 billion over seven years. 10 In 
the 2012-13 budget, this figure was adjusted to $5.5 billion over four 
years.11 
3.12 While this Review examines Defence’s annual report for the 2011-2012 
financial year, it is still necessary to examine these long term budget cuts. 
The Committee focused particularly on the impact of cuts on capability 
planning and acquisition, and on the provision of services at bases and 
other facilities. 
Capability planning and acquisition 
3.13 In regard to capability planning and acquisition, Defence noted that while 
‘critical capabilities’ would continue to be delivered as planned, it has still 
been necessary to defer some projects: 
There were 57 projects in all which were deferred mostly by one or 
two years as part of the last budget.12  
3.14 Defence discussed further the budgetary implications of the economic 
uncertainty, noting that it would not affect the delivery of the core 
capabilities outlined in the Defence White Paper 2009: 
The government is committed to delivering the core capabilities 
enunciated in the 2009 white paper such as the air warfare 
destroyers, the helicopter landing docks, the Joint Strike Fighter 
program, the future submarines and the like. The government is 
on the public record as doing that. We do face challenges, quite 
obviously. The 2009 white paper was predicated on Defence 
 
10  Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Cost of Defence 2011-2012, p. vi. 
11  Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Cost of Defence 2012-2013, p. vi. 
12  Vice Admiral James, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 24. 
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spending increasing by three per cent real out to 2018-19 and, 
because of fiscal circumstances, that has not been able to be 
implemented. We have had, as you have stated, a reduction in the 
Defence budget as part of the government’s broader fiscal strategy 
and we have had other matters move to the right. All of that poses 
challenges for us, but at present we will be able to deliver on the 
core capabilities identified in the 2009 white paper, even though 
the delivery of some may be deferred beyond the original 
timetable.13 
3.15 Defence elaborated on the ways it is managing the delivery of key 
capabilities in light of reprioritisation: 
The reprioritisation of Defence expenditure in the 2011-2012 
budget was designed to have minimum impact on the delivery of 
core Defence capabilities. A number of lower-priority capability 
projects were deferred with a small number cancelled where they 
were superseded by alternative capabilities, and other capability 
and facility programs were subject to re-scoping. Australia will 
continue to maintain one of the strongest military capabilities in 
our region. 
[…] 
In conjunction with establishing a new funding model for Defence, 
the Defence budget has been reprofiled over the Forward 
Estimates for expenditure on priority Capital Investment and 
Sustainment Programs. This includes the acquisition of 12 new 
EA-18G Growler aircraft, as announced in the White Paper, for 
which the Government will also provide Defence an additional 
$200 million in 2014-2015. The reprofiling of the budget will in the 
usual way involve adjustments to the priority of activities across 
Defence, including proposed capability acquisitions. Details will 
be provided in the next Public Defence Capability Plan, to be 
published before the end of the 2012-2013 financial year.14 
3.16 In regard to capability acquisition, the Defence Materiel Organisation 
(DMO) told the Committee that, despite the impression given by public 
discussion that capabilities are often delivered over budget, Defence has a 
strong track record of completing such projects under budget. The DMO 
argued: 
Defence projects which come in under budget are the norm. Since 
July 2010 59 major projects have been closed following successful 
 
13  Mr Richardson, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 25. 
14  Department of Defence, Submission No. 5, p. 8. 
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introduction into service. On average these projects were 
completed within 95 per cent of the approved budget. Of this only 
four projects required a real cost increase to complete approved 
scope.15 
3.17 The DMO also told the Committee that its practices and project 
management policies are ‘under constant review to incorporate lessons 
learned and streamline processes’. The DMO elaborated on how it was 
achieving this: 
The DMO has invested heavily in people through the 
establishment of a project management professionalism 
framework to enable people in project management roles to 
acquire the knowledge, skills and competence for the effective 
management and delivery of projects. This framework provides a 
range of training pathways including practitioner courses, 
nationally accredited vocational based training and post graduate 
education options. DMO has developed Communities of Practice 
across the scheduling, cost estimation and project management 
streams, which enable knowledge sharing and the identification of 
best practice processes that can be applied across the 
organisation.16 
3.18 When questioned about the cost growth indexation figures it currently 
uses when formulating budgets, Defence noted that the indices it uses 
were: 
…formulated back in the Pappas review, when McKinseys did 
their review. It is a composite of indices. […] The indices that the 
Pappas report referred to is quite an extensive list, but we with 
Pappas eventually settled on a more manageable list of indices. 
Some of the indices that he in the first instance recommended were 
a little obscure and it was difficult to obtain regular updated 
information for them. There is a practicality involved in that as 
well.17  
3.19 Defence elaborated on the specific cost growth indices currently in use: 
The cost growth figures used in the Defence budget utilise a basket 
of five indices to model the future costs of Defence. The basket of 
indices is as follows: 
 
15  Department of Defence, Submission No. 5, p. 3. 
16  Department of Defence, Submission No. 5, p. 5. 
17  Mr Prior, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 27-28. 
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 Military Equipment Capital and Sustainment – 4 per cent US 
Department of Defence Procurement Index; 39 per cent Wage 
Price Index and 21 per cent Producer Price Index; 
 Personnel – 100 per cent Wage Price Index; 
 Facilities – 100 per cent Gross Fixed Capital Non-Dwelling 
Construction Index; and 
 Other Operating Expenses – 100 per cent Non Farm Gross 
Domestic Product implicit price deflator.18 
Provision of services to ADF personnel 
3.20 Another area of focus for the Committee where significant savings are 
being achieved within the Defence budget is in ‘non-equipment 
procurement’, which includes the provision of services to ADF personnel 
and Defence facilities, travel, building maintenance, professional services 
and removals.19 This is examined in greater detail in Chapter Six on the 
Strategic Reform Program. 
Reporting the Defence budget 
3.21 The Defence Annual Report 2011-2012 contains two mentions of the effects 
of the current budgetary constraints. The main mention is contained in the 
section dealing with the DMO, which notes: 
Current budget conditions are tight and the impacts cannot be 
avoided or ignored. The only way to survive is through expert 
management of our day to day business. For acquisition, this 
means extracting every bit of value from every dollar we spend. 
For sustainment, it means making every effort to align support 
concepts with customer demands, and ensuring that we do not 
allow capabilities to be hollowed out over time.20 
3.22 When asked whether there is any wider public reporting on the 
consequences of the constrained budget, Defence stated: 
I suppose Senate estimates and this committee hearing today go to 
just that. At the last Senate estimates hearing, we spent a day 
before the Committee; and, if the Committee had wanted to, we 
could have spent two days before the Committee. Senators were 
free to ask the department any question they wanted on any 
matter and, indeed, there were a lot of questions digging down 
 
18    Department of Defence, Submission No. 5, p. 11. 
19  Mr Grzeskowiak, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 30. 
20  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 148. 
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further. […] So, in terms of our responsibility to provide 
information to Parliament, this is what we are doing.21 
3.23 Defence also noted that, in addition to the estimates process, Defence’s 
annual report, and reviews of their annual report, there is ‘an articulation 
of any cuts documented’ in its portfolio budget statements.22  
3.24 Additionally, Defence argued that the Annual Report is not of sufficient 
size to incorporate all of the effects and implications of declining budgets: 
In the sense of practicality this [annual] report for 2011-2012 is 540 
pages thick; if we were to go through it project by project and take 
out lessons learnt we will be in something even less manageable. 
There is a need for practicality here as to where the information 
about the department is coming out.23 
3.25 Furthermore, Defence told the Committee that the Australian National 
Audit Office (ANAO) regularly produces reports that highlight the impact 
on capabilities that declining budgets can have. In particular, Defence 
directed the Committee’s attention to a recent ANAO report on the project 
to acquire the MU90 lightweight torpedo, noting: 
Yes, we acknowledge that there are calls for greater transparency 
and so forth but there are many routes to achieve that; it does not 
have to be in a single document. Indeed, this [annual] report is for 
2011-2012, so if you are looking at implications of financial 
reductions made in the budget 2012-2013 one would not expect 
them to be reflected in this report – hence they are reflected in the 
PBS for the period. 
Operations 
3.26 A significant portion of the 2011-2012 Defence budget went towards a 
number of operations within Australia, in Australia’s immediate region, 
and in Afghanistan. Furthermore, a large portion of the operations 
occurring overseas came in under budget. 
Flood relief operations in Australia 
3.27 The Defence Annual Report 2011-2012 notes that ‘the ADF provided 
support to the Queensland, New South Wales and Victorian Governments 
 
21  Mr Richardson, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 26. 
22  Mr Richardson, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 26. 
23  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 27. 
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in the wake of serious flooding events’.24 Defence told the Committee that 
the additional costs incurred by this support operation totalled $1.157 
million.25 
3.28 Defence further noted that these costs were incurred primarily by flights 
to Brisbane, and that when expenditure on any operation is below $10 
million a year, any costs are absorbed by Defence into the current 
structure of its budget and will not appear in its Annual Report.26 
3.29 Furthermore, while natural disasters do form part of Defence’s 
preparedness and readiness planning, they do not form part of its 
budgetary planning. This is because these operations usually do not cost 
more than $10 million. In cases where they do cost more than $10 million, 
Defence informed the Committee of the means by which the budget is 
maintained: 
For any of our operations, wherever they occur and however they 
occur, there is an appropriation arrangement where, if the costs 
are greater than $10 million, we are funded on a no-win, no-loss 
basis – that is, we are supplemented for them. Where they are less 
than $10 million we absorb the costs within the base of our 
funding, and that has been a long-standing arrangement.27 
3.30 Overall, Defence characterised the impact of natural disaster relief on its 
budget as ‘marginal’. This is because a large portion of the cost of 
responding to natural disasters is tied up in defence personnel and does 
not constitute additional expenditure. Defence elaborated on this at a 
public hearing: 
Those [personnel] costs are already there; there is no marginal cost 
of deploying people to those disasters as opposed to their regular 
activities, in the main. It is the same with asset deployments – 
vehicles and the like. We do have budget lines for the fuel and for 
the running costs of those assets, so it is a matter of reprioritising 
the assets and the activities to what other activities they might 
have done.28 
 
24  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 127. 
25  Department of Defence, Submission No. 2, p. 3. 
26  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 28. 
27  Mr Prior, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 28. 
28  Mr Prior, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, pp. 28-29. 
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Operations in the immediate region 
3.31 Operation ANODE, which supports Australia’s mission of assistance in 
Solomon Islands, came in $5 million under budget in 2011-2012. Defence 
explained this at a public hearing: 
Actual expenditure for Operation ANODE was $5 million less 
than budget due to lower than estimated costs for the use of 
reservists on continuous full time service, lower than anticipated 
logistics support requirements, lower than planned strategic lift 
costs, and lower than planned costs for sustainment and 
remediation of equipment.29 
3.32 Similarly, Operation ASTUTE in Timor-Leste came in well under the 
$160.2 million it was expected to cost. The Defence Annual Report 2011-2012 
explained this: 
Actual expenditure for Operation ASTUTE was $18.5 million less 
than budget due to lower than estimated personnel costs for 
Permanent and Reservists on continuous full time service, saving 
under the logistic support contract, variations in planned facilities 
works, lower than anticipated strategic lift requirements and lower 
than planned costs for sustainment and remediation of 
equipment.30 
Operations in Afghanistan 
3.33 In regard to Operation SLIPPER in Afghanistan, the Defence Annual Report 
2011-2012 notes: 
The 2011-2012 Budget initially provided $1.221 billion for the 
continuation of operations in Afghanistan in 2011-2012. The 
Government provided a further $2.2 million at Additional 
Estimates to enhance detainee management in Afghanistan taking 
the 2011-2012 Revised Estimate to $1.224 billion.31 
3.34 However, actual expenditure came in significantly lower than was 
budgeted, with SLIPPER costing $157.3 million less than expected. 
Defence explained that this was due mainly to: 
...delays in facilities projects, delays in the implementation of the 
logistics and base support services contracts, lower than 
anticipated strategic lift requirements due to savings associated 
 
29  Department of Defence, Submission No. 2, p. 4. 
30  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 113. 
31  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 113. 
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with contracted helicopter support, and lower than anticipated 
costs against sustainment and remediation of equipment.32 
3.35 Furthermore, the Defence Annual Report 2011-2012 notes that enhanced 
force protection in Afghanistan was $233.2 million less than the 2011-2012 
revised estimate of $392.4 million. Force protection is dealt with in greater 
detail in Chapter Four. 
Committee comment 
3.36 The Committee acknowledges that Defence reports on its budget in a 
variety of contexts, including through parliamentary processes like Senate 
Estimates and this Review, as well as through budget documents and 
ANAO audits. Furthermore, the Committee accepts Defence’s contention 
that the Annual Report is already of substantial size. Nonetheless, it is clear 
to the Committee that the Defence Annual Report does not currently deal 
with the Defence budget in enough detail. Ultimately, it should be 
possible to ascertain which projects are of most concern as a result of 
budgetary considerations from reading the annual report. However, this is 
not currently the case. 
3.37 Additionally, it has become clear through the Senate Estimates process 
that over the last several years, Defence’s budget for sustainment has been 
reduced by budget cuts. This reduction in the sustainment budget could 
have an impact on Australia’s ability to conduct a major operation. As a 
result, greater transparency in the reporting of the budget for sustainment 
in the Annual Report is required. 
3.38 In light of this, the Committee believes it would be desirable for a more 
holistic account of the important information relating to the Defence 
budget and its implications for capability acquisition and sustainment of 
capabilities and facilities to be included in future Annual Reports. 
3.39 The Committee deals with the issue of reporting in greater detail in 
Chapter Seven. 
 
32  Department of Defence, Submission No. 5, p. 15. 
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Force Protection 
Background 
4.1 In July 2009, the then Minister for Defence directed the then Chief of the 
Defence Force (CDF) to carry out a review of the force protection measures 
available for Australia’s deployed troops.1 This direction reflected the fact 
that the Government places the protection of soldiers deployed in 
Afghanistan as one of its highest priorities.2  
4.2 In June 2010, Defence outlined the outcomes of the Review: 
… this work put forward 48 recommendations for enhancements 
to our force protection measures, particularly reflecting the 
escalating improvised explosive device (IED) and rocket attacks in 
Uruzgan Province. It ensured a coherent, comprehensive and 
complete approach to force protection. 
The force protection improvements… cover a variety of active and 
passive measures, which range from personal protective 
equipment for our soldiers, to unmanned surveillance systems.3 
4.3 In order to implement these changes, the Government in 2009 committed 
$1.1 billion of funding for enhanced force protection measures for troops 
in Afghanistan. This was in addition to approximately half a billion 
dollars of existing measures. Hence, a total of $1.6 billion was committed 
 
1  Senator the Hon John Faulkner, Minister for Defence, ‘Force Protection Measures’, Media 
Release, 01 June 2010, p. 1  
2  Senator the Hon John Faulkner, Minister for Defence, ‘Force Protection Measures’, Media 
Release, 01 June 2010, p. 1 
3  Senator the Hon John Faulkner, Minister for Defence, ‘Force Protection Measures’, Media 
Release, 01 June 2010, p. 1 
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to enhanced force protection measures over the financial period 2009-10 to 
2012-13.4 
4.4 During the public hearing for this inquiry, Defence outlined the current 
status of this funding: 
$150 million of that has been returned to government because we 
did not need either the capability or the level of funding that was 
allowed for when the plan was first done. There is about $250 
million planned to be spent this year in that program.5 
4.5 Thus, the review of force protection conducted in 2009 provides critical 
context for the Committee’s inquiry into force protection. Both the 
Committee and Defence were focussed on ensuring that the Review’s 
recommendations were being adequately implemented. Hence, current 
force protection issues were discussed with regular reference to the 
Review. 
4.6 The Committee focussed on a range of force protection issues, entailing 
three particular categories.  
 First, the Committee was concerned with force protection capabilities 
which seek to protect against harm on an individual level, such as body 
armour, helmets and physical employment standards. 
 Second, the Committee inquired into capabilities protecting the force as 
a whole on a larger scale, such as through vehicles as well as 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.  
 Third, the Committee was mindful to inquire into Defence’s processes 
for responding to force protection issues and improving capabilities.  
4.7 Notably, the Committee’s consideration of the issue of force protection 
capabilities has been closely intertwined with the effects of the drawdown 
from Afghanistan. This drawdown is dealt with in greater detail in 
Chapter Two. 
Protection of individuals 
4.8 The first element of force protection entails capabilities directly aimed at 
making individual uniformed personnel less likely to be harmed in 
operations, and minimising harm when it does occur. These capabilities 
 
4  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, Question without Notice – Force protection 
measures, 28 October 2010, p. 1. 
5  Air Vice Marshal Hart, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 16. 
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occur in two forms: first, equipment of individual force members; second, 
physical characteristics of these force members.  
4.9 In relation to force protection equipment for the individual, the 
Committee focussed on night-vision goggles, combat helmets and ‘new 
camouflage’ uniforms, as well as the over-arching consideration of the 
weight of a soldier, ‘fully-kitted’ with appropriate equipment. 
4.10 In relation to individual force member characteristics, the Committee 
focussed upon physical training as well as employment standards for 
various roles in the Australian Defence Force (ADF). 
Night-vision goggles 
4.11 During its visit to Afghanistan in 2011, the Committee was informed that 
the night-vision goggles in use were about 10 years old. The Committee 
was therefore concerned that night-vision goggles available to personnel 
in Afghanistan were not up to date.  
4.12 Defence responded to this concern by acknowledging the problem, 
explaining the causes and emphasizing the priority given to the issue. 
Specifically, Defence stated: 
The issue here is that Australia competes across the world for 
access to state-of-the-art equipment. We have an ageing fleet of 
night vision devices and there is a program inside the Defence 
Capability Plan (DCP) to upgrade that to the next generation; we 
will do that; it is still a very high priority.6 
4.13 Defence further stated that the operational requirements demanded of the 
system, particularly by special forces in Afghanistan, have been met where 
they can be through sourcing available stocks. However, these stocks are 
in short supply.7 
4.14 Defence stated that improvements have been made in the 18 months since 
the Committee’s visit to Afghanistan. However, Defence explained the 
practical challenges involved in dealing with this issue, and 
acknowledged that the current situation is not optimal: 
I am not sure we have satisfied all of the soldier requirements but 
we have certainly made important steps. I cannot, nor can the 
Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), produce equipment for 
soldiers if it is not there to actually procure.8 
 
6  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 17. 
7  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 17. 
8  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 17. 
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Combat helmets 
4.15 The 2009 force protection review specified ‘improved body armour’ as an 
important element of force protection initiatives.9 As a result, the 
Committee focussed upon the effects of an upgraded combat helmet. 
4.16 Defence explained that all close combatants are currently using the 
upgraded Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH).10 Defence then elaborated on 
exactly what the ECH offers: 
It has the same weight and ballistic protection as the non-
upgraded ECH. The weight is 1.35 kilos. The improvement with 
the upgraded helmet is that it provides better blunt force 
protection, and that is largely because of its improved padding 
and suspension system. It is also able … to accommodate various 
other systems that are on the soldier. That is most particularly the 
case with night vision goggles.11 
4.17 Furthermore, the Committee inquired what the troops’ assessment has 
been of the upgraded helmet. Defence responded by noting that the troops 
were consulted throughout the study which informed the upgrade, and 
then the eventual selection and procurement of the upgraded helmet. The 
feedback from troops has been positive in response to the upgraded 
ECH.12 
New camouflage uniforms 
4.18 The Committee sought feedback from Defence on the testing of a new 
camouflage uniform for the Australian army, namely the ‘Crye patterned 
uniforms’, in the context of force protection.  
4.19 Defence responded that the feedback has been very good, and 
subsequently explained the specifics of this positive feedback as drawn 
from soldiers, stating: 
The feedback has been very good. You might be aware that 
initially, on fielding the new uniform, we had some problems with 
the wear and tear—literally—of the uniforms, most notably in the 
trousers. That has been resolved now. The stitching on the 
uniforms has proved to be very successful, and, while you will still 
have damage to uniforms because of the environment that they are 
worn in, the utility of the new uniforms, both in terms of fit and in 
 
9  The Hon. Greg Combet AM MP, Minister for Defence Materiel and Science, ‘Defence Budget 
Breakfast’ Speech, National Press Club, 12 May 2010, p. 2. 
10  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 35. 
11  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 35. 
12  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 20. 
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terms of camouflage, has been very highly rated by those who 
have used them. Soldiers like the adaptions that have come with 
uniforms—most particularly the lighter fabric that can be worn 
under the body armour that soldiers wear, and that has pointed a 
way for me as the Chief of Army to the future. 13 
4.20 In terms of the future direction of these uniforms, Defence explained: 
We are looking at the moment at where we go with the 
replacement of our current uniform, but that will be done within 
the budget that is allocated to the Army. 
The pattern has proved to be very good in the operating 
environment that it is used in, in Afghanistan, but I have asked for 
a broader study to be done about its utility in different 
environments… So these decisions are all coming into play now.14 
Overall weight of soldier 
4.21 An over-arching issue when considering the various specifics of force 
protection equipment for an individual, is the overall weight of a fully 
kitted soldier.  
4.22 Defence explained that there is not a standard weight for a soldier as it is 
dependent on the specific role they perform, and hence ‘kit’ that they 
require. However, as a general comment, Defence stated that at the 
moment, ADF soldiers’ load-carrying has gotten heavier as the ADF has 
been able to furnish them with additional equipment.15 
4.23 Defence then stipulated three responses to the issue of heavier loads for 
soldiers: 
 The first is ensuring that the equipment that we furnish them 
with is the lightest and most functional that we can provide, 
and we certainly do a lot of weight testing as part of the 
selection process as we look at new pieces of equipment. 
Batteries are a prime example, and the need for batteries 
bedevils almost all modern armies. We have so many systems 
now that have to be powered by battery, and that is added to 
the weight. There is a lot of work done to consider that.  
 The second area is that we need to look at the physical training 
that we give our soldiers. We know that weight carriage is an 
important part of a number of the roles that our soldiers 
perform, and the recent introduction of the physical 
employment standards across the ADF, but certainly in the 
Army, was done after considerable discussion and trialling 
 
13  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 20. 
14  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 20. 
15  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 21. 
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with Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) 
assistance. That has allowed us to do a number of other things 
as well, most particularly open up all of our trades to women, 
because physical employment standards have to be met 
irrespective of gender.  
 The third area that we look at now is whether we need to carry 
all of our equipment all of the time… We have looked at how 
we can provide soldiers with lighter packs that are used for 
shorter periods of time and we bring heavier stores up to 
forward operating bases or to areas where they have ready 
access to it. That has changed, in some respects, the way the 
Army operates and it has been a recognition of the need to be 
able to address the tactical requirements that we have.16 
Physical characteristics of uniformed personnel 
4.24 The second element of Force Protection considerations for individuals 
entails physical characteristics of uniformed personnel. The Committee 
considered this both in terms of employment standards for entry into the 
force, as well as the physical training of individuals once they are serving 
in the ADF. 
4.25 When asked about the nature of physical employment standards in the 
ADF, Defence stated that there is a baseline standard for all categories of 
ADF personnel that must be met, irrespective of size or gender.17  
4.26 Defence stated that the focus of employment standards is on getting the 
right person in the right job at the right time. Certain occupations in the 
Army entail physiological criteria.18 
4.27 Further, Defence explained that there are also certain physiological criteria 
for particular positions in the Air Force. For example, if an individual is 
colour blind, this disqualifies them from certain positions. Also, 
anthropometric measurements become relevant to employment standards 
in terms of fitting into aircraft and ejecting.19  
4.28 The Committee noted that it may be possible for an individual to meet a 
certain physical standard on a certain day, but then not meet the standards 
in the days following due to problems of recovery. This may particularly 
be the case for women. Thus, the Committee inquired as to whether the 
ADF considers this recovery aspect in employment and training. 
 
16  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 21. 
17  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 22. 
18  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 22. 
19  Rear Adm. Walker, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 22. 
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4.29 Defence explained that this recovery aspect is part of the standard that 
must be met. Moreover, the training given to ADF personnel ensures they 
are able to maintain this standard, with adequate recovery: 
You cannot employ a physical employment standard (PES) and 
have a soldier meet it once and just allow them to develop from 
there. The standard itself is one part of this but it is the training 
that allows you to attain that standard and then maintain that 
standard which is actually the heart of what we call the PES 
system. I agree with you that the physical capacity of women to 
carry out arduous physical activities in an enduring way needs to 
be examined. The PES was introduced late last year and there is a 
year-long trial currently underway, with the Army as the primary 
agent for conducting the trial. I have had some feedback talking to 
women who have been undergoing it that they have some 
concerns about particular areas. My point to them is that we will 
take that information and incorporate it into the year-long trial 
but, having opened up all of our trades to women, the standard 
has to be such that we are confident that you can perform at that 
standard or higher in an enduring way, otherwise we would 
actually see a degradation of capabilities.20 
Protection of force as a whole 
4.30 Capabilities associated with protecting the force as a whole occur on a 
much larger scale than individual items. The Committee sought an update 
on the status of these capabilities within the context of the drawdown 
from Afghanistan. 
4.31 In regard to funding, Defence explained that current force protection 
activities are predominately funded through operational supplementation. 
As a result the Committee focussed on inquiring about funding issues for 
these capabilities going forward, amidst the withdrawal from operations. 
4.32 Further, Defence explained that there are ongoing questions regarding 
what equipment is to be brought back from Afghanistan and what is done 
once it is returned, particularly in terms of remediating equipment.21 
4.33 Fundamental to modern force protection in the ADF is protection against 
improvised explosive devices (IED). Therefore, the particular focus of 
these larger-scale capabilities tends to occur in the counter IED space. 
 
20  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 22. 
21  Air Vice Marshal Hart, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 15. 
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Counter IED Capability 
4.34 In the context of capabilities protecting the force as a whole, Defence 
identified three key ‘platform’ based capabilities central to counter IED: 
I would say the three big platform based items we need to make 
decisions about are in the counter IED space and that is in the 
route clearance area, counter rocket and mortar fire capability 
(CRAM) – the radars and the vehicles and so forth – and then the 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) area, where we 
own some platforms and we have others on contract. What do we 
do with those as we wind down. They are the three big areas.22 
4.35 Defence subsequently elaborated on the costs of these capabilities, noting 
that the total acquisition costs for CRAM were approximately $253 
million; counter IED $429 million, and ISR $160 million. Defence further 
noted that: 
The annual cost to support these capabilities in-theatre has been 
approximately $149 million. These figures do not include items 
such as consumables which can be attributed across a range of 
activities.23 
4.36 Central to the status of counter IED capabilities are decisions associated 
with Defence’s response to the ‘wind down’ in Afghanistan, which is 
discussed in further detail in Chapter Two of this report. 
Route clearance 
4.37 Enhanced route clearance capability was an initiative stemming from the 
2009 Force Protection Review as an element of counter IED capability. 
Defence offered further detail on the current status of the initiative: 
… we have introduced into theatre a much more hardened and 
mobile counter-IED road clearance or route clearance system built 
on a configuration of a number of vehicles that work together to 
produce that. I think we still need to make a decision about 
whether we want to retain that or how much of that we would 
want to retain back in Australia once it comes back… We are still 
very much learning how to use that.24 
 
22  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 16. 
23  Department of Defence, Submission No. 5, p. 8. 
24  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 14. 
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ISR capability 
4.38 ISR capability was also outlined in the force protection review of 2009 as 
an important element of force protection, within counter IED capability.25 
4.39 Given the importance of ISR to effective force protection, Defence 
explained the recent cancellation of the funding for the acquisition of 
Intelligence, Surveillance Reconnaissance Electronic Warfare (ISREW) 
aircraft, stating: 
What we had there was to move the sensor pack and put it on a 
different platform. So we moved it across to an unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) rather than a manned aircraft. So we now have that 
change-detection capability, for example, that we did not have 
before. That would be something we would want to continue on… 
it is a very good capability.26 
4.40 Defence further explained the current status of UAV capability. Whilst this 
capability is moving forward, there are elements of uncertainty amidst the 
drawdown from Afghanistan: 
We went into Afghanistan with UAV programs coming through in 
the Defence Capability Plan, so there is a platform there for 
funding into the future… We have operated now three different 
types of UAVs: ScanEagle, Shadow and Heron. As we look to the 
future now… what does that transition path look like?27 
4.41 Defence elaborated on this ‘transition path’, noting that if a UAV 
capability is taken back from Afghanistan, decisions must be made as to 
how to bring it in to the ADF and sustain it, in the Air Force for example.28 
Defence told the Committee that it is mindful of these issues and is 
continually considering them. 
Force protection improvement process 
4.42 The Committee raised concerns regarding two procedural elements of 
developing and improving Force Protection capabilities. The first concern 
related to Australia’s research and development activities in this area, 
particularly in the context of the drawdown from Afghanistan. Second, the 
Committee expressed concern regarding the ‘filtering up’ of force 
 
25  The Hon. Greg Combet AM MP, Minister for Defence Material and Science, ‘Defence Budget 
Breakfast’ Speech, National Press Club, 12 May 2010, p. 2. 
26  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 15. 
27  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 15. 
28  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 15. 
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protection issues from soldiers on the ground to the relevant decision-
makers upon Force Protection capabilities. These two issues were explored 
in detail at a public hearing. 
 
Research and development 
4.43 The Committee was concerned with ensuring that research and 
development, particularly in regard to critical force protection capabilities 
like counter IED capabilities, is not hampered by the withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. Given that a lot of leading edge thinking and ability occurs 
in the context of active involvement in operational tasks and developing 
solutions to particular threats. Hence, the Committee sought evidence 
from Defence indicating that this important element of advancing Force 
Protection capabilities would not atrophy post-withdrawal. 
4.44 Defence responded by referring to the Counter IED Task Force (CIED TF). 
The CIED TF was established in 2006 to coordinate and monitor the ADF’s 
response to the IED threat, and is constantly exploring technology-based 
opportunities to strengthen counter IED capabilities. Research and 
development is critical in this area, particularly through the work of the 
DSTO.29 
4.45 The Committee asked whether the CIED TF is potentially an area of 
ongoing support for the Afghan National Army (ANA) post 2014, 
assuming the insurgency there continues to use IEDs with their 
indigenous forces. 
4.46 Defence responded that this may not be a role for the ADF taskforce alone, 
and further that: 
I think it would be more US led with contributions from others in 
terms of assisting. So at the moment the program that the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Training Mission 
Afghanistan is looking at is how to provide—and there is already 
some kit being filtered—an individual counter-IED capability that 
has […] an anti-tamper capability – it cannot be backwards 
engineered and so forth.30 
4.47 Specifically, the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan is currently 
looking at how to provide an individual counter-IED capability with 
certain features. 31 A lot of work has gone into this in the last 18 months, 
 
29  Department of Defence, ‘Global Operations – Afghanistan – Factsheet’, viewed on 29 May 
2013, <http://www.defence.gov.au/op/afghanistan/info/factsheet.htm> 
30  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 14. 
31  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 14. 
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with significant involvement from the ADF. In fact, DSTO has produced 
an item which performs certain features ‘perfectly well’, such as an anti-
tamper capability that cannot be backwards engineered. The ADF is in 
discussions with the US regarding using this item.32 
4.48 Defence offered an explanation as to how they were seeking to prevent 
any ‘atrophy’ in terms of DSTO’s technical, innovative design and 
development capabilities, as Australia withdraws from areas of active 
counterinsurgency: 
There are two aspects to that. We will continue to maintain a 
counter-IED analysis development capability in the ADF, 
fundamental to our future capability. Whilst we are in 
Afghanistan, we will keep a link in the US counterparts, who are 
really the leaders in this and then secondly with the Brits, so we 
will keep the technical expertise up. Further to that, we are already 
engaged in the region in trying to develop in specific countries 
their counter-IED capability as well.33 
4.49 The Committee expressed concern that the ADF is moving merely towards 
a ‘monitoring overwatch’ in Afghanistan. This monitoring role might miss 
an opportunity to continue to engage Australia’s scientific and technical 
workforce in an operational environment where a lot of leading edge 
thinking and ability comes. 
4.50 Defence responded to these particular concerns by further elaborating on 
the two elements of their earlier response: 
… we will want to be involved and we will stay involved in the 
development program. How active we can be in Afghanistan 
when we do not have a requirement in the field ourselves, is an 
issue but we will stay involved in the counter-IED fight. We are in 
an excellent place now and I do not want to lose that.34 
Force protection issues response 
4.51 Issues of force protection are of critical importance as they directly affect 
the safety and livelihood of troops ‘on the ground’ at operational level. 
The Committee asked what Defence is doing to ensure that force 
protection issues experienced by troops are ‘filtering up’ to the relevant 
decision-makers. 
 
32  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013,  p. 14. 
33  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013,  p. 14. 
34  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013,  p. 15. 
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4.52 Defence described the processes they have instituted that are specifically 
designed to ensure force protection issues experienced by troops are dealt 
with by the relevant decision makers.35 
4.53 Defence conceded that: 
… in the early parts of the operations in Afghanistan, where we 
were trying to ensure that the equipment that soldiers used, either 
for a military purpose or for self-protection, was appropriate, it 
was probably not supported by a system back here in Australia 
that was as responsive as it could have been.36   
4.54 However, Defence contended that improvements have been made and 
lessons have been learnt in this regard: 
That was a lesson for the Army as it was for the DMO, but it is a 
lesson that I can say confidently has been learnt. Certainly, over 
the last three years… we have put in place a system that allows us 
to look rapidly at issues that are presenting themselves in the 
battle space and make appropriate responses to them.37 
4.55 Defence further explained that a key element of this improved system of 
response has been the establishment of the ‘Diggerworks’ organisation. 
This is an organisation of Army personnel in the DMO and the DSTO. The 
key role of Diggerworks is to conduct soldier engagement while 
coordinating rapid trialling and implementation of soldier combat 
systems,38 and ultimately to deliver new equipment to better protect 
Australian troops.39 
4.56 Defence further explained that Diggerworks has improved Defence’s 
response to ‘ground-level’ force protection issues by utilizing recent 
operational experience:  
Diggerworks has been a major feature in improving the flash-to-
bang, if you like, of what is a tactical or operational requirement 
and having it met. Almost all of the staff at Diggerworks have had 
recent operational experience… so they have taken very current 
knowledge back here into the DMO to make sure that the correct 
focus is given. That has resulted in a very much improved 
allocation of operationally required equipment into theatre. 
 
35  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013,  p 17. 
36  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p 17. 
37  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013,  p 17. 
38  The Australian Army, ‘Army and Diggerworks’, viewed on 29 May 2013,     
<http://www.army.gov.au/Our-work/Partnerships/Army-and-Diggerworks> 
39  The Hon. Jason Clare MP, Minister for Defence Material, ‘Diggerworks – New team 
established to enhance protection of Australian soldiers in Afghanistan’, Media Release, 28 
August 2011. 
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Supporting that has been a capability assessment board that now 
runs in Army that takes the lessons learnt from the tactical level… 
and fuses that with the soldiers’ desires for particular pieces of 
equipment.40 
4.57 In addition to these formal mechanisms for responding to force protection 
issues, Defence outlined the informal communication that further informs 
these processes. Defence stated that all of the senior officials who visit 
Afghanistan ask questions about soldiers’ views on equipment: 
I asked maybe 700 soldiers the last time I was there in the various 
visits I made to forward operating bases – the overwhelming 
response is that we have the best equipment in the world.41 
Committee comment 
4.58 The Committee is mindful of the need to ensure that force protection 
issues experienced by troops at ground level are being adequately 
communicated to and dealt with by decision makers. The Committee is 
reassured by evidence presented by Defence that these ‘filtering up’ 
processes are adequate and continually improving, through both formal 
and informal mechanisms. 
4.59 The Committee is concerned that amidst the ADF withdrawing from 
operations, research and development in the area of force protection 
capabilities may deteriorate. Defence provided evidence to reassure the 
Committee that it will continue to actively prioritise advancement in this 
area. 
4.60 The Committee is also mindful of the need to ensure that force protection 
capabilities at the level of individual items were up-to-date and of high-
quality. Defence contended that whilst all requirements are not met 
perfectly due to resource constraints, Defence places a high priority on 
these capabilities and is continually monitoring potential improvements 
through regular engagement with troops. 
4.61 The Committee notes ongoing issues with force protection capabilities 
amidst the drawdown from Afghanistan. The Committee resolves to 
monitor decisions regarding what capital machinery and vehicles to bring 
back, and what to do with them once they return. The Committee will 
maintain a focus on this issue into the future. 
  
 
40  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p 17. 
41  Lt Gen. Morrison, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p 18. 
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Reviews of Defence Culture 
Background 
5.1 In April 2011, following an incident at the Australian Defence Force 
Academy (ADFA), the Minister for Defence announced that a series of 
urgent reviews would be conducted on a wide set of aspects of Defence 
culture. 
5.2 The reviews announced by the Minister were: 
 Review of the use of Social Media in Defence 
 Review into the Treatment of Women at ADFA and in the wider Australian 
Defence Force (ADF) (conducted by the Sex Discrimination Commissioner, 
Ms Elizabeth Broderick) 
 Review of the use of Alcohol in the ADF 
 Review of Personal Conduct of ADF Personnel 
 Review of the Management of Incidents and Complaints in Defence 
 Review of Defence Australian Public Service (APS) Women’s Leadership 
Pathways 
5.3 The Minister also announced the DLA Piper Review of Allegations of Sexual 
and Other Forms of Abuse in Defence. 
5.4 The Reviews point to opportunities to improve Defence systems and 
processes and also evolve Defence cultures. Moreover, they provide an 
opportunity to continue the work of making Defence workplaces safe and 
equitable for all. 
5.5 The Reviews were overseen and coordinated by a Steering Committee 
chaired by the Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF). Defence’s 
comprehensive response to these cultural Reviews, the Pathway to Change: 
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Evolving Defence Culture outlines how the recommendations of the reviews 
will be implemented consistent with the wider Defence reform 
programme. 
5.6 The Committee sought an update from Defence on the progress of 
implementation of these various reviews. In eliciting this update, the 
Committee focussed on issues related to all these reviews with the 
exception of the Review of the use of Social Media in Defence. 
5.7 In addition to exploring issues related to these Reviews, the Committee 
was mindful to explored two further culture-related issues:  
 the progress of the ‘Reconciliation Action Plan’, an important initiative 
concerning Defence’s engagement with Indigenous persons and issues.  
 Disability programs in Defence, particularly initiatives assisting injured 
personnel. 
5.8 There are two sections in this chapter: 
 a summary of the various Defence Culture Reviews; and 
 a summary of the Committee’s exploration of Defence culture-related 
issues primarily arising from these reviews. 
Summary of reviews 
Review of personal conduct of ADF personnel 
5.9 Major General Craig Orme led this review which focused on on assessing 
the effectiveness and current policies governing ADF conduct, and 
identifying areas of strength and weakness. The Review recommended: 
 A culture that is just and inclusive. 
 The ADF will more explicitly state values and behaviours on 
enlistment, and reinforce them through education and practice. 
 The Navy, Army and Air Force will continue to improve avenues of 
communication for members to report concerns about personal conduct 
through the formal chain of command and through confidential 
methods of reporting.1 
 
1  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, ‘Reviews into Defence and Australian 
Defence Force Culture’, Media Release, 7 March 2012, p. 1. 
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Review of the treatment of women in the Australian Defence Force 
5.10 Ms Elizabeth Broderick, the Sex Discrimination Commissioner, conducted 
the Australian Human Rights Commission Review of the Treatment of 
Women in the ADF. The Review was conducted in two phases:  
 Phase One of the Review – in to the Treatment of Women at ADFA – 
was tabled in Parliament on 3 November 2011. Phase One of the Review 
found that there have been improvements in the culture at the 
Academy since the mid-1990s. The Review acknowledged that the 
experiences of both male and female midshipmen and officer cadets at 
the Academy are for the most part positive. However, the Review also 
found widespread, low-level sexual harassment, inadequate levels of 
supervision, cumbersome complaints process and an equity and 
diversity environment marked by sanction rather than positive 
engagement. The Review also identified areas in ADFA’s culture which 
could be improved and recommended improvements such as providing 
quality staffing at ADFA, management of complaints, accommodation 
for students and mechanisms to better manage the risk of injury to 
female cadets. 
 Phase Two of the Review – into the Treatment of Women in the ADF – 
was tabled in the Parliament in August 2012. Phase Two dealt 
comprehensively with the careers of women in the ADF from 
recruitment and retention to career choices, work-life balance practices 
and policies, leadership and topics such as sexual harassment, 
discrimination and sexual assault. Phase Two made 21 
recommendations covering five key principles that aim to: 
⇒ Actively promote a broad organisational understanding of diversity 
as both a core Defence value and an operational imperative linked to 
capability and operational effectiveness; 
⇒ Address the significant under-representation of women at decision 
making level; 
⇒ Increase the number of women recruited to the ADF as a whole, but 
also to specific occupational areas and units; 
⇒ Improve the level to which the ADF assists serving women and men 
to balance their work and family commitments; and 
⇒ Establish a new and more robust approach to responding to 
unacceptable sexual behaviours and attitudes.2 
 
2  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, ‘Reviews into Defence and Australian 
Defence Force Culture’, Media Release, 7 March 2012, p. 1. 
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Review of the use of alcohol in the ADF 
5.11 Professor Margaret Hamilton, an executive member of the Australian 
National Council on Drugs, led an independent panel to review the 
overall strategy for managing the use of alcohol in the ADF. Immediate 
and specific initiatives included: 
 The preparation of an evidence-based alcohol management strategy for 
implementation within Defence; 
 Defence to ensure that the pricing of alcohol available at Defence 
establishments is consistent with the alcohol management strategy; 
 Developing an approach to collecting and responding to alcohol related 
data to enhance its value in terms of managing individuals and 
strategic planning; this will include alcohol screening of individuals at 
recruitment and across important career transition points, particularly 
post-deployment, and a whole of ADF Alcohol Incident Reporting 
System; 
 Commanders to assess situations in which alcohol is proposed to be 
used informally or formally and where specific approval would then be 
required for the use and access to alcohol within ADF work location; 
and 
 Defence to form alliances and partnerships with other organisations 
and individual experts on alcohol outside Defence to provide their 
input into alcohol policy and program development and 
implementation.3 
The Review of the use of social media in Defence 
5.12 Mr Rob Hudson, from the external consulting company George Patterson 
Y & R, led a team to examine the impact of the use of social media in 
Defence, with the aim of developing measures to ensure that the use of 
new technologies is consistent with ADF and Defence values. His 
recommendations included: 
 All policies relating to the use of social media, the internet or cyber 
activities to be reviewed, including a review of guidelines to ensure 
they are consistent with the overall social media policy and engagement 
principles; 
 Defence should consider reviewing social media training and the way it 
is prioritised and delivered in order to ensure consistency, including 
relevant resources, guidelines and support mechanisms; and 
 
3  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, ‘Reviews into Defence and Australian 
Defence Force Culture’, Media Release, 7 March 2012, p. 1. 
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 Resources will be provided to support the understanding and 
management of social media in Defence.4 
Review of the management of incidents and complaints 
5.13 The Inspector General of the ADF, Mr Geoff Earley AM, conducted a 
review of the management of incidents and complaints in Defence, with 
specific reference to the treatment of victims, transparency and processes 
and the jurisdictional interface between military and civil law. His 
recommendations include: 
 Funding to be provided as a matter of priority to contract out the task of 
reducing the current grievance backlog of cases to suitably qualified 
legal firms; 
 Training and information to be provided to ADF members in relation to 
the management of incidents, and complaint processes will be 
simplified and improved; 
 Defence’s administrative policies to be amended to provide for 
administrative suspension from duty, including the circumstances in 
which a Commander may suspend an ADF member and the conditions 
which may be imposed on the suspended member; and 
 An improved process to manage grievances in Defence will also be 
developed.5 
Review of Defence Australian Public Service women’s leadership 
pathways 
5.14 The review into Defence as an employer of woman was led by the former 
Deputy Public Service Commissioner, Ms Carmel McGregor, who 
examined the effectiveness of current strategies and proposed 
recommendations across a range of issues relating to employment 
pathways for Defence APS women. Ms McGregor has subsequently been 
appointed to the position of Deputy Secretary People Strategies and Policy 
in Defence. Her recommendations include: 
 The Secretary to issue an explicit statement to senior leaders and staff to 
reinforce the importance of gender diversity to build a sustainable 
workforce; 
 The establishment of a rotation program for senior women at Senior 
Executive Service Band 2/3 with the broader APS; 
 
4  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, ‘Reviews into Defence and Australian 
Defence Force Culture’, Media Release, 7 March 2012, p. 1. 
5  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, ‘Reviews into Defence and Australian 
Defence Force Culture’, Media Release, 7 March 2012, p. 1. 
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 Ensure female membership in senior decision-making bodies; 
 Implement a development program for Executive Level women that 
includes job rotation, as well as over-representing women in existing 
development programs; 
 Embed a focus on identifying and developing women for leadership 
roles, including a facilitated shadowing and coaching component, in the 
new talent management system; and 
 Establish a central maternity leave pool for central management of the 
full-time equivalent liability associated with maternity leave.6 
DLA Piper Review of Allegations of Sexual and Other Forms of Abuse 
in Defence 
5.15 On 11 April 2011 the Minister for Defence Stephen Smith announced an 
external review of allegations of sexual and other forms of abuse that were 
raised following the ADFA ‘Skype’ incident.  
5.16 In response to these allegations, the law firm DLA Piper was engaged by 
Defence to review each allegation methodically and at arm’s length from 
Defence to make recommendations for further action.7 
5.17 On 11 October 2011, DLA Piper submitted Volume 1 of its Report – 
General Findings and Recommendations and the first tranche of Volume 2 
in relation to Individual Allegations.8 
5.18 On 7 March 2012, the Minister announced the release of redacted extracts 
of Volume 1: Facing problems of the past – General findings and 
recommendations.9 
5.19 On 17 April 2012, the Minister announced he had received the final 
tranche of Volume 2 of the Report – Individual Allegations. 
5.20 On 14 June 2012, under Freedom of Information provisions, the un-
redacted Executive Summary to the DLA Piper Review Team’s Volume 1 
Report became public. 
 
6  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, ‘Reviews into Defence and Australian 
Defence Force Culture’, Media Release, 7 March 2012, p. 1. 
7  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, ‘Release of Volume 1 of the DLA Piper 
Report: Allegations of sexual and other abuse in Defence’, Media Release, 10 July 2012, p. 1. 
8  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, ‘Release of Redacted Extracts from 
Executive Summary and Findings of Volume 1 of the DLA Piper Report: Allegations of sexual 
and other abuse in Defence’, Media Release, 7 March 2012, p. 1. 
9  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, ‘Release of Redacted Extracts from 
Executive Summary and Findings of Volume 1 of the DLA Piper Report: Allegations of sexual 
and other abuse in Defence’, Media Release, 7 March 2012, p. 1. 
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5.21 On 10 July 2012, the Final Report of Phase 1 of the DLA Piper Review of 
Allegations of sexual and other abuse in Defence was released.10 
5.22 On 26 November 2012, the Minister for Defence announced the 
Government’s response to the Review into Allegations of Sexual and other 
forms of Abuse in Defence. The response included: 
 A general apology to members of the ADF or Defence employees who 
have suffered sexual or other forms of abuse in the course of their 
employment 
 The establishment of an independent Taskforce to assess the individual 
complaints and any wider systemic issues to be headed by the Hon Len 
Roberts-Smith QC.  
 Access to a capped compensation scheme; and 
 A free telephone hotline (already established) so that complainants can 
access information about the Government’s response.11 
The Pathway to Change: Evolving Defence Culture 
5.23 Defence’s response to these cultural Reviews, the Pathway to Change: 
Evolving Defence Culture, outlines how the recommendations of the 
reviews will be implemented consistent with the wider Defence reform 
programme. Pathway to Change also builds on the institutional and 
personal accountability reforms in Defence to implement the Review of the 
Defence Accountability Framework (the Black Review) announced in August 
2011. 
5.24 Implementation covers a series of systemic changes, as well as more 
immediate and specific initiatives. This includes: 
 Increasing diversity within leadership groups; 
 Fully implementing ADFA reforms to address safety and behaviour 
issues at ADFA; and 
 Applying principles of the ADFA reforms to all new starter training 
institutes across Defence. 
5.25 Most of these will require a 2-3 year period to fully implement and for 
their impacts to be embedded in Defence’s culture. There are over 130 
 
10  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, ‘Release of Volume 1 of the DLA Piper 
Report: Allegations of sexual and other abuse in Defence’, Media Release, 10 July 2012, p. 1. 
11  Department of Defence, ‘Pathway to Change’ – DLA Piper Review of Allegations of sexual 
assault and other abuse in Defence’, viewed 5 June 2013, 
<http://www.defence.gov.au/pathwaytochange/docs/DLAPiper/index.htm>.  
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recommendations in the Pathway to Change response comprising all of the 
recommendations from the reviews into Defence culture and relevant 
recommendations from the Black Review. To date, 33 recommendations 
from the Reviews have been actioned.12 
Review updates and discussion 
DLA Piper Review – update and discussion 
5.26 The Committee inquired about particular issues related to the DLA Piper 
Review and its implementation. 
Views of ‘abuse’ within Defence 
5.27 The Committee questioned Defence about its view of the nature of abuse, 
within the context of the DLA Piper Review. 
5.28 Defence assured the Committee of their recognition that the problems 
people have as a result of abuse is a Defence problem, not just a problem 
related to the person themselves.13 
5.29 When the Committee sought further elaboration upon Defence’s view of 
the nature and scope of abuse, Defence explained in response: 
I think we have got it clearly laid down in a number of our 
Defence instructions in terms of what sexual, physical abuse and 
so forth relate to.14 
5.30 Further, Defence assured the Committee that they were actively dealing 
with psychological forms of abuse: 
We certainly have policies around bullying, harassment and 
mental abuse in those terms of relationships with members of the 
ADF and in the department more broadly.15 
5.31 Defence elaborated on the formal policies surrounding these types of 
abuse: 
They go to the full spectrum and in fact there are a range of 
instructions that guide managers and commanders in the 
organisation. Firstly, there is the Defence Instructions (General) 
Personnel Management and Reporting of Sexual Offences; 
 
12  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, ‘Implementation of Defence cultural reform 
– Pathway to Change’, Media Release, 26 November 2012, p. 1. 
13  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 36. 
14  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 38. 
15  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 38. 
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secondly, there is a Defence Instructions (General) Personnel 
Management and Reporting of Unacceptable Behaviour which is 
very broad, however within those guidelines there is quite specific 
guidance; thirdly, the Defence Instructions (General) Personnel 
Jurisdiction under Defence Force Discipline Act. That is guidance for 
military commanders. Fourthly, there is Defence Instructions 
(General) Reporting and Management of Notifiable Incidents. That 
then goes to various parts of the organisation who have particular 
remits depending on which part of the workforce they are dealing 
with and the type of offence or mistreatment.16 
Scope of DLA Piper Review Allegations 
 
5.32 The Committee focused on the scope of allegations falling within the 
ambit of the DLA Piper Review’s processes. 
5.33 Regarding the scope of allegations, Defence stated that it was unaware of 
any reports made against existing members of the force in relation to the 
Review.17 
5.34 The Committee sought information from Defence regarding the process of 
dealing with allegations under the DLA Piper Review, and particularly the 
process of determining whether an allegation occurs within the scope of 
the Review. The Committee was mindful to ensure that the process 
allowed cases to be dealt with in a fair and just manner. 
5.35 Defence responded by explaining the bounds of the review in general 
terms, as initially intended by the Minister for Defence: 
The announcement by the Minister, even before formal terms of 
reference were identified, focused on certain areas of allegations. It 
was not framed in terms that there would be a review of every 
issue that every person ever had with any arm of the Australian 
Defence Force, the Department of Defence or any entity which 
might now be reflected within that construct. We were not going 
back to all questions, for instance, about why a person did not 
enlist; we were not going back to contractual questions; we were 
not going back to a whole range of things because they were 
excluded of their nature by the type of work. In matters where 
people had identified their issue, in some cases, when you applied 
that fairly simple precept, the matters fell outside what were 
 
16  Ms McGregor, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 38. 
17  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 36. 
52 REVIEW OF THE DEFENCE ANNUAL REPORT 2011-2012 
 
intended. There are other avenues for some of those matters, but 
they were not intended to be covered by that.18 
5.36 Defence elaborated on the process of determining whether a matter fell 
within or outside the intended scope of the Review: 
The process of considering whether matters were in scope or out 
of scope has been identified publicly in a number of forums. It 
involved an initial decision which was formed within the team 
working on behalf of DLA. Where they came to a view that a 
matter was out of scope, they provided it to Defence Legal. Where 
we took a view that perhaps suggested we thought there was a 
question or something that they may have overlooked, we 
returned it to them. In other cases, if we considered that their view 
was sound, the matter went straight off to the ombudsman. Any 
matter that—if I can put it this way—both DLA and we felt was 
beyond the terms went to the ombudsman.19  
5.37 Defence then explained that all these decisions regarding whether a matter 
fell within the scope of the Review, are now being reviewed by the 
independent Taskforce established in November 2012: 
In all circumstances in any case, in terms of the current handling, 
all of those matters are part of what Mr Roberts-Smith and the 
taskforce are reconsidering. So regardless of the past… the issues 
are back before the entirely independent taskforce. So that whether 
any of those views were valid, questionable or found wanting, Mr 
Roberts-Smith and his taskforce entirely independent from any 
part of Defence Legal will look at them.20  
5.38 The Committee further inquired into this issue with particular regard to 
persons contractually dealing with the ADF. The Committee specifically 
asked whether a person, not directly employed by Defence, who felt they 
had been a victim of abuse by someone employed by Defence, would be 
able to bring their case before the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce 
(DART). Defence responded by stating: 
… it depends on the type of abuse. In a sense, this is a somewhat 
academic discussion at this point, because the ultimate test is a test 
of what the taskforce pursues at this stage, regardless of what has 
happened in the past.21 
 
18  Mr Cunliffe, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 37. 
19  Mr Cunliffe, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 36. 
20  Mr Cunliffe, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 37. 
21  Mr Cunliffe, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 37. 
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5.39 Whilst Defence explained that these decisions whether claims are in scope 
are the responsibility of the independent Taskforce, the Committee was 
concerned that decisions may be made that are contrary to the revised 
understanding of the DLA Piper terms of reference. 
5.40 Specifically, the Committee quoted from the ‘Defence Abuse Reparation 
Scheme Guidelines’: 
I will give you this specific reference. It is 3.1.4, sub paragraph (c). 
It says ‘A person is eligible if they were at the time of the alleged 
abuse employed in Defence.’ This automatically appears to 
exclude an individual who may have been representing a 
company who was dealing with a Defence official. That seems at 
odds with the revised understanding of the DLA Piper terms of 
reference.22 
5.41 Defence responded by stating that the interpretation of those terms of 
reference is a matter for the independent taskforce.23 
5.42 However, noting that the intent of the terms of reference must be 
absolutely clear, the Committee questioned whether Defence could seek to 
have these terms of reference clarified. Defence responded by re-iterating 
that these are issues for the independent taskforce: 
I do not think we can help you clarify the intent because the 
taskforce is entirely separate to the department, and is operating 
entirely separately to the department.24 
Terms of reference drafting 
5.43 The Committee was engaged in an in-depth exploration of the Review’s 
terms of reference. Specifically, the Committee sought to clarify the role of 
Defence Legal in the writing of these terms of reference. 
5.44 Defence responded by explaining the process of drafting and finalising the 
terms of reference: 
They were finalised and settled by the Minister in the Minister’s 
office. But, yes, Defence Legal were involved in terms of preparing 
some of the wording.25 
 
22  Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 37. These guidelines provide for reparations to people who 
plausibly suffered abuse in Defence prior to 11 April 2011, as part of the Australian 
Government’s response to the Report of the Review of allegations of sexual and other forms of abuse 
in Defence. 
23  Mr Richardson, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 38. 
24  Mr Richardson, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 38. 
25  Mr Cunliffe, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 36. 
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5.45 When questioned on whether Defence Legal having a role in the drafting 
of the terms of reference could constitute a potential conflict of interest, 
Defence definitively rejected this idea: 
No, I do not and I would not [call this a conflict of interest]. What 
we do is serve the Defence interest, and in this respect the Minister 
and the leadership’s interest in terms of trying to formulate the 
wording for the independent work. The final settling of that was 
for the Minister, and I think the degree to which there might be 
argument about the terminology is an issue which goes to the 
policy formulation, which we tried faithfully to reflect.26 
Review of the use of alcohol in the ADF – update and discussion 
5.46 The Committee explored the issue of the use of alcohol in the ADF. In 
order to place this exploration in the context of society as a whole, 
Defence’s attention was drawn to an Australian Medical Association 
(AMA) report into alcohol use amongst young Australians. This report 
specifically looked at people in the age group of 14 – 24. It found that 80 
per cent of the alcohol consumed by people in this age range is consumed 
in ways that put the drinker’s (and others’) health at risk. 27 It was 
suggested that the findings were particularly relevant for the ADF, as 
most people entering ADFA or other military training are under the age of 
24. 
5.47 The report’s findings regarding behaviours associated with alcohol use 
amongst this age group, including sexual misconduct and assaults were 
noted. These behaviours occur at particularly high levels in residential 
boarding situations. It was suggested that this report was highly relevant 
to Defence particularly in the context of behaviour at ADFA. 
5.48 Defence responded by acknowledging the significance of the report and 
expressing a high motivation to confront these issues in the context of the 
ADF: 
We are taking this very seriously. In fact, that AMA report that 
came out about young people under the age of 24 drinking to 
harm was what really struck a chord with us with our own 
experiences… Given our demographic, we should be leading in 
this space.28 
 
26  Mr Cunliffe, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 36. 
27  Australian Medical Association, Alcohol Consumption and Alcohol Related Harms – 2012, 
viewed 5 June 2013, < https://ama.com.au/position-statement/alcohol-consumption-and-
alcohol-related-harms-2012>.  
28  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 41. 
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5.49 Furthermore, Defence outlined the background of the Hamilton Report, 
which looked at alcohol use in the ADF, and the development of plans to 
implement reforms in this area: 
The Hamilton review is one of eight reviews conducted in 2011-12. 
We have an implementation plan now working its way through in 
response to that, and the aim of the plan is to build the ADF’s 
capacity to effectively manage alcohol and therefore enhance its 
operational capacity, reduce personal harm—which is a very 
important part of this—and minimise organisational costs. We 
have been working for quite a while; early in 2011, before the 
announcement that the Hamilton review was to be undertaken, we 
were working with the Australian Drug Foundation to develop an 
alcohol management system… Joint Health Command has been 
working in very close step with that organisation. I hope we will 
have a nationally ground-breaking approach to alcohol 
management in the ADF when we complete that strategy.29 
5.50 Notably, Defence not only outlined plans for a new approach, but also 
explained practical measures that have already been taken as a response to 
the Hamilton Review: 
We have not been idle though. In the meantime, we have taken a 
number of initiatives. We have looked at ADF’s alcohol policy in 
regard to the access to and management of alcohol on our bases. 
We are in the process of looking at the management of garrisons, 
reducing bar hours and making them more appropriate to work 
conditions, and changing the nature of alcohol that can be served 
on our bases.  
We have put out a statement on alcohol behaviour expectations. 
We have produced an alcohol management guide for our 
leadership at all levels and we have put out new guidelines for 
ADF hospitality management so that we set an example across the 
organisation about when and where the consumption of alcohol 
should occur and costs related to that. The alcohol management 
strategy, when it emerges, will be ground-breaking, I believe.30 
Review into the Treatment of Women in the Australian Defence Force 
– update and discussion 
5.51 The Committee sought evidence from Defence regarding the status of 
implementation of the Review of the Treatment of Women in the ADF 
 
29  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 40. 
30  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 41. 
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recommendations. The Committee was eager to canvass the general 
implementation of this Report, but with a particular focus on standards of 
behaviour within ADFA.  
5.52 Defence responded by offering a detailed explanation of the practical 
measures taken to implement the Review: 
After the events of April 2011, we had a major review conducted 
by the Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Elizabeth Broderick, 
who produced a report about the treatment of women at ADFA. 
We have been diligently working through the recommendations of 
that review, phase 1, and we will receive the Sex Discrimination 
Commissioner’s report on our progress, I think, in the next month 
or close to. 
We have done a number of things in response to her report. We 
have established a residential support officer scheme within each 
of the residential blocks and so forth in the cadet accommodation. 
We have created a dedicated 24/7 emergency and support hotline 
for the cadets, their families and the staff—so broader than the 
institution itself. ADFA midshipmen and cadets have been 
provided details of a range of support options regarding health 
and wellbeing, sexual and personal abuse, and violence. We also 
have links to a number of external support services. All of these 
are in accordance with Ms Broderick’s recommendations. That 
links into the broader phase 2 review, where we are well 
progressed in implementing a number of those recommendations.  
We have developed a database relating to individual complaints. 
This is one of the key things that came out of Ms Broderick's report 
into both the ADF and the ADFA, and that is in place in ADFA 
now. We have completely revised our teaching of equity and 
diversity in the academy. It is much more scenario based, practical 
and related to the age and situation, and there is a very clear 
separation between equity and diversity training and the 
complaints procedures because they had become merged and 
were not being put into place properly.31  
5.53 Further, the Chief of the Defence Force, General Hurley, placed these 
actions in the particular context of ADFA and the standards of behaviour 
within the Academy: 
I have every confidence in the Defence Force Academy. I have said 
this at a number of parades I have attended. I say it to parents. I 
would put the performance and the record of the Australian 
 
31  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 41. 
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Defence Academy against any major similar residential institution 
in the country. We have a good crop of young people there; I think 
they are well led. They have been through a difficult time and, if 
you were to go and talk to them now, particularly those who have 
been there over the last two years, yes, they have learnt a lot—
hopefully, they have learnt a lot about leadership. But I think they 
have shown a strength and resilience that we should all be very 
proud of. They are a good bunch of young people.32 
Standards of behaviour in the ADF 
5.54 The Committee further explored this issue of standards of behaviour in 
the ADF. Particularly, the Committee questioned Defence about whether 
they aim for a standard of behaviour which reflects broader community 
standards, or a higher standard. The Committee inquired about this in the 
context of reference to the previously mentioned AMA report which 
outlined worrying trends in relation to alcohol abuse for persons under 24. 
5.55 Whilst stating that the ADF aims for standards higher than the broader 
community, Defence cautioned that these broader standards are very 
difficult to definitively measure, but that ADF standards of behaviour are 
currently high: 
I think our standards across the board, particularly in ADFA, are 
very high. I have said on a number of occasions, when we talk 
about Pathways to Change, that the ADF needs to reflect the 
community it comes from more closely than it might have in the 
past and that we will be held to higher standards than the general 
community. If you look at the Pathways to Change, the thrust of 
what we are trying to achieve there, we recognise that. It is very 
hard to say what is the measure of Australia's standards. You can 
get quantitative data; it is probably harder to get qualitative data. 
But even on the quantitative sense, if we rank ourselves around 
general communities, or populations of the size of 100,000 people, 
our standards and our behaviours are something we should be 
proud of. To go back to DLA Piper and the stories it tells us, it is 
an aspect of ADF history that we should not be proud of, but 
again, I have been very, very strong in statements that the ADF is 
not an abusive organisation. I think its standards are high on the 
whole and we should continue to work to keep them there.33 
 
32  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 41. 
33  Gen. Hurley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 41. 
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Women’s careers strategies 
5.56 Both the Broderick Review34 and the Review of Defence APS Women’s 
Leadership Pathways outlined the importance of strategies seeking to 
advance career opportunities for women in the Australian Defence 
Organisation (ADO). 
5.57 The Committee sought evidence from Defence regarding the 
implementation of strategies associated with career development, 
particularly for women. Within this issue, the Committee focussed 
particularly on workplace flexibility as an issue affecting both men and 
women. 
5.58 Defence responded by offering a detailed explanation of the actions they 
are taking to provide a flexible workplace: 
…that whole area of workplace flexibility was one that Liz 
Broderick observed in her reports, and it is No.1 of the bulletin 
terms of concerns that people have about being able to participate 
fully in the ADF and the broader department. Similarly, in the 
Review of Defence APS women’s leadership pathways… it was a very 
significant issue. It was gender neutral—men and women—in a 
modern workplace…  In terms of the work we have been doing, 
inside the department there have been a range of initiatives over 
the last 12 months that the services have been really pushing for 
and wanting to have put in place in a policy sense. 
I will run through a couple of them: 1 December 2012—carer's 
leave provisions for ADF members came into effect. That means 
members had an increase in the number of carer’s leave days that 
they could access from five days to 10, and the scope of carer’s 
leave was broadened to include situations where a member is 
required to provide care and support to the dependents who live 
with them, so when they are injured or affected by an unexpected 
emergency as well as if they are sick. Changes to the Paid Parental 
Leave scheme came into effect on 28 February and that meant that 
members had greater flexibility in how they accessed paid 
parental leave and were able to choose parental leave at full pay, 
half-pay or a combination of both. Work is currently being 
undertaken in regard to purchasing recreation leave, but we will 
have to develop a system to enable members to purchase that 
leave. It is anticipated that we will have that in place by the middle 
of this year and that will benefit all members. We are also looking 
at non-dependent carers living in Defence housing and allowing 
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ADF members to have an au pair live in their subsidised housing 
for the purpose of providing assistance with child care. 
There are a range of these things which we are pleased are coming 
to fruition. There is still much more that we can attend to, but I 
think it is starting to demonstrate to people that we are being able 
to respond to their needs and provide a contemporary flexible 
workplace.35 
5.59 Defence elaborated on the other actions it was taking to ensure its 
employees had access to the greatest possible level of workplace 
flexibility: 
The current policy relating to flexible employment is under review 
in order to: 
 Broaden the parameters and reaffirm Defence’s commitment to 
flexible employment, reinforcing full-time and part-time 
flexible employment options, as well as part time options; 
 Establish targets for flexible employment for each Service, in 
line with Recommendation 13 of the Broderick Review (phase 
2); and 
 Develop strategies within the current workforce management 
systems to collect data on access and uptake of flexible 
employment, which will be reported annually in the “Women 
in the ADF” report, in accordance with Recommendation 3 of 
the Broderick Review (Phase 2).36 
5.60 Furthermore, Defence told the Committee that: 
ADF positions are not formally designated as being specifically 
part-time or full-time. Decisions to approve part-time filling of 
positions are made on a case by case basis under the board policy 
context that: 
 ADF personnel are entitled to access part-time work on return 
from Maternity or Paternity leave for a period of up to two 
years, this includes adoptive parents; and 
 ADF personnel are not limited by location to access part-time or 
full-time flexible employment.37 
Indigenous participation in the Australian Defence Organisation 
5.61 The Committee invited evidence from Defence regarding initiatives to 
increase Indigenous participation in both the civilian and force spheres of 
the ADO. 
 
35  Ms McGregor, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 42. 
36  Department of Defence, Submission No. 5, p. 42. 
37  Department of Defence, Submission No. 5, pp. 42-43. 
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5.62 The Defence Annual Report 2011-12 outlined the background to these 
initiatives: 
The Diversity Directorate within Defence People Group oversees 
the implementation of initiatives and strategies arising from the 
Defence Reconciliation Action Plan 2010-14 and the whole-of-
government targets set under the Closing the Gap on Indigenous 
Disadvantage agenda. Funding for these strategies is provided 
under the Defence White Paper 2009.38 
5.63 Further, the Report explained that implementation of the ‘Reconciliation 
Action Plan’ (RAP) entails a ‘refreshed strategy’ in 2011-12: 
During the 2011-12 reporting period there has been a focus on the 
Indigenous Employment Strategy, with strategies being examined 
that will improve recruitment of Indigenous peoples into Defence. 
A refreshed strategy is being considered for implementation 
during the new reporting period.39 
5.64 The Committee noted that the RAP was very detailed, and sought further 
information from Defence regarding the strategy underpinning that initial 
Plan, as well as the ‘refreshed strategy’ for 2011-12. 
5.65 Defence responded by outlining the central themes of the RAP, in the 
context of an increased focus on employment strategies: 
We are refreshing it as you have mentioned, and sometimes the 
detail and complexity does not help us, but we have the three 
thematic areas of changing perceptions: going to the heart of 
community and cultural engagement; providing specialised 
pathways, which are through the variety of the employment 
programs; and the support—that is, the networks and programs to 
support Indigenous employees. We will frame the plan and the 
responses under those themes. It is probably not as far advanced 
as we would have liked but it is definitely on its way.40 
5.66 Furthermore, Defence elaborated on the current status of Indigenous 
employment in both the ADF and APS sides of Defence: 
You have got the ADF and the civilian side. The ADF is doing 
better than on the civilian side. We are having a look at Indigenous 
employment in defence on the civilian side at the moment. We are 
working through a systematic approach to that and our 
performances have not been very good. We are looking at what 
 
38  Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2011-12, September 2012, p. 278. 
39  Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2011-12, September 2012, p. 278. 
40  Ms. McGregor, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 42-43. 
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partnerships we might be able to develop with some colleges. We 
are looking at what more we might do. Particularly when we look 
at our civilian employment in Queensland and the Northern 
Territory, for instance, we do not do very well at all on the civilian 
side. We are working through some initiatives we might take to be 
able to improve our outcomes there. The ADF is doing a lot 
better.41 
5.67 The Committee sought further specifics on the actions Defence is taking to 
improve Indigenous participation in the APS. Defence assured the 
Committee that they were exploring a variety of initiatives. For example, 
Defence considers questions such as whether to require consideration of a 
person’s status as an Indigenous Australian when engaging contractors in 
the context of the current retendering for Defence’s major contracts.42  
5.68 A significant initiative undertaken by Defence in this area has been the 
continued delivery of the ‘Defence Indigenous Development Program’ 
(DIDP) in Katherine and Cairns. 
5.69 DIDP is part of the Government’s Indigenous employment program. It is a 
joint initiative between the Department of Defence, the Department of 
Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) and the 
Northern Territory Department of Education and Training. The program’s 
graduates complete a seven month live-in course to provide young 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander adults with the life skills and 
confidence to secure opportunities and sustain continuous employment of 
their choice.43 
5.70 The Committee recognised the significance of this program and sought an 
update on its progress from Defence. Defence responded by explaining 
that: 
We are currently in the assessment phase for this year. We have 58 
people being assessed in the next couple of weeks, of which we are 
hoping 30 to 35 will be picked up in the Northern Territory. I 
actually do not have the breakdown of Katherine versus Darwin 
there, but that is the progress for this year. The course will actually 
start on 3 May…44 
 
41  Mr Richardson, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 39. 
42  Mr Richardson, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 39. 
43  Department of Defence, ‘Defence News Archive – Traineeds graduate from Defence 
Indigenous Development Program’ viewed 5 June 2013, 
<http://www.defence.gov.au/defencenews/stories/2012/nov/1114.htm.>. 
44  Ms Mcgregor, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 38. 
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In Cairns there will be 20. We currently have around 34 people in 
the assessment phase.45 
Disability programs in Defence 
5.71 In discussing programs to encourage greater participation by persons with 
disabilities, the Committee focussed particularly on initiatives assisting 
ADF personnel who have been injured on operations. 
5.72 Defence reassured the Committee of the importance placed on this issue, 
particularly in the present context as approximately 279 ADF personnel 
have been injured in either Iraq or Afghanistan.46  
5.73 Moreover, Defence outlined the practical measures taken to assist injured 
and disabled personnel in the context of future employment in both the 
uniform and civilian side of Defence. 
5.74 In the context of the APS, Defence explained that they are currently in the 
process of developing initiatives to assist with the employment of people 
emerging from operations with severe disabilities, particularly in the 
context of people returning from Afghanistan. Defence expressed 
confidence that positive results will come from this process within the 
next 12 months.47 
5.75 In the context of ADF personnel, Defence offered a detailed explanation of 
the processes involved in the rehabilitation of casualties, including future 
employment assistance: 
Under the rehabilitation program—and it includes all our people, 
not just our battle casualties—we look at whether our members, 
whatever their injury or illness, are fit to stay in their current trade, 
whether they are fit to be retrained in another trade but stay in the 
military or whether they required to be discharged. It is about 
looking individually at their cases to see what can be provided. 
At the higher end of the injury scale, under the Simpson Assist 
program, we have commenced piloting two intensive 
rehabilitation centres, one in Holsworthy and one in Townsville at 
Lavarack Barracks. There we are looking at providing the 
rehabilitation high end. We have exercise physiologists, 
rehabilitation consultants, psychologists and general doctors. It is 
about rehabilitating people back to not just activities and daily 
 
45  Ms Mcgregor, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 39. 
46  Mr Richardson, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, page 39. 
47  Mr Richardson, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, page 39. 
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living but also meaningful work opportunities. As part of that we 
also identify people who we think will be discharged and offer 
them training opportunities within whatever area they would like. 
Some of them have trained as baristas, some of them are doing 
other TAFE courses; it is about working with the individual to see 
what opportunities they might seek when they look to discharge. 
It might be giving them an opportunity to see if this is the area 
they wish to go into, and we are trialling that activity. 
There is a range of opportunities in the rehabilitation of 
individuals either as they stay in the military, change and retrain 
or as they move out.48 
5.76 Defence assured the Committee of the importance of each individual case 
of an injured or disabled ADF person, and the practical initiatives in place 
to offer appropriate assistance. 
Committee comment 
5.77 The Committee was mindful to ensure that Defence demonstrate a 
practical commitment to implementing the findings of their various 
culture reviews. This is especially important in light of the recent 
revelations of sexually inappropriate behaviour by a group of Defence 
personnel, which has so far resulted in the suspension of some personnel, 
and investigations into the conduct of others. The Committee also notes 
the strong response to this revelation by the Chief of Army.49 Defence’s 
detailed evidence assured the Committee that whilst there is still a lot of 
work to be done, numerous initiatives and reforms are being undertaken 
through the strategies outlined in Pathway to Change which reflect a 
commitment to enduring cultural reform. 
5.78 The Committee notes that instances of inappropriate behaviour are not 
isolated to Defence and the ADF, rather they are issue which affect the 
whole of Australian society. The Committee understands that, when 
compared to rates of abuse in other parts of Australian society, the ADO 
has a relatively low number of incidents. Nonetheless, the Committee 
commends Defence’s efforts to ensure that this relatively low number of 
incidents is further decreased. 
 
48  Rear Adm. Walker, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, p. 40. 
49  Department of Defence website, ‘Chief of Army addresses allegations of unacceptable 
behaviour’, Media Release, 13 June 2013, viewed 17 June 2013, 
<http://news.defence.gov.au/2013/06/13/chief-of-army-addresses-allegations-of-
unacceptable-behaviour/>.  
64 REVIEW OF THE DEFENCE ANNUAL REPORT 2011-2012 
 
5.79 The Committee was concerned that there may be a lack of clarity 
regarding the nature of allegations fitting within the scope of the DLA 
Piper Review. While Defence stated that decisions regarding whether a 
claim fits within the scope are in the hands of the independent taskforce, 
the Committee was concerned that there exists a lack of clarity specifically 
regarding whether a complainant is excluded from the scope of the DART 
processes because they are not an employee of a Defence organisation. 
This uncertainty should be remedied. 
 
Recommendation 1 
 The Committee recommends that the ‘Defence Abuse Reparation 
Scheme Guidelines’ and the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce terms 
of reference should be reviewed to clarify: 
 whether cases involving a complainant not employed by 
Defence fall within the scope of the relevant processes; and  
 what abuses are defined as in and out of scope, including 
whether abuses which constitute offenses under relevant 
Commonwealth legislation are included.  
 
 6 
 
Strategic Reform Program 
Background 
6.1 The Strategic Reform Program (SRP) began with the 2009 White Paper, 
Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030. According to the 
Defence White Paper 2013: 
The 2009 Defence White Paper emphasised that Defence must be 
effective in delivering its mission, and efficient across every aspect 
of its business. The Government established the SRP as part of the 
2009 Defence White Paper to overhaul the Defence enterprise for 
this purpose.1 
6.2 The 2013 White Paper further notes that: 
The Government and Defence are absolutely committed and 
focused on continued delivery of the defence reform agenda, 
building on and updating the original SRP. Strategic and fiscal 
developments since 2009 have reinforced the imperatives of an 
agile, innovative, efficient and networked Defence Organisation. 
Defence will continue to integrate the reforms initiated since 2009 
into the existing reform framework to achieve a comprehensive 
and coordinated reform agenda.2 
6.3 As the 2013 White Paper discusses, the SRP has achieved $3.3 billion in 
savings ‘as well as capability and productivity improvements across 
Defence’s operations, capability, organisation and culture’.3 
 
1  Defence White Paper 2013, p. 91. 
2  Defence White Paper 2013, p. 96. 
3  Defence White Paper 2013, p. 91. 
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6.4 These savings have been achieved through a variety of initiatives, all of 
which revolve around the elements outlined in The Strategic Reform 
Program: Delivering Force 2030: 
 Improved Accountability in Defence. Providing much greater 
transparency - that is, visibility of how Defence manages the 
close to $26 billion annual budget - will strengthen the 
accountability of Defence, and individuals within Defence, to 
the Government, to Parliament and the Australian taxpayer.  
 Improved Defence Planning. Improving our strategic and 
corporate level planning will strengthen the link between 
strategic planning and the definition and development of 
military capabilities; better control the cost of military 
preparedness; and tighten governance and systems to ensure 
that Defence accurately forecasts and manages major 
acquisitions. 
 Enhanced Productivity in Defence. Implementing smarter, 
tighter and more cost effective business processes and practices 
will make sustainment and support management more efficient 
and effective; improve cost effectiveness for military capability 
and procurement processes; and create the basis for a more 
efficient Defence Estate footprint.4 
6.5 The Defence Annual Report 2011-2012 noted that the SRP is continuing: 
…to provide a means for long-term business transformation that 
would make the Defence organisation more efficient, effective and 
accountable and will continue to be implemented in the context of 
an expanding reform agenda.5 
6.6 The Defence Annual Report 2011-2012 also gave an update on the current 
reform priorities with the SRP: 
The priority is to ensure that the SRP integrates effectively with 
the broader reforms, while continuing to pursue efficiencies and 
cost reduction in a tight fiscal environment. The Associate 
Secretary Chief Operating Officer (COO) now has oversight 
responsibility for the SRP. The COO will assist Defence to position 
reform as mainstream business, drive further reforms and 
integrate the business processes across Defence Groups.6 
 
4  The Strategic Reform Program: Delivering Force 2030, p. 5. 
5  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 238. 
6  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 238. 
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2011-2012 cost reductions 
6.7 In the 2011-2012 financial year, the Defence Annual Report 2011-2012 notes 
that, across the Defence portfolio, $1.24 billion in savings were achieved. It 
further states that this is: 
…97 per cent of its cost reduction target of $1.284 billion for the 
financial year… and a significant achievement in difficult fiscal 
circumstances.7 
6.8 Additionally, the Defence Annual Report 2011-2012 states that these savings 
were achieved without impacting the agreed levels of capability of the 
Australian Defence Force (ADF). For instance, the report notes that in 
terms of the capabilities of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), ‘there were 
no adverse SRP-related impacts to agreed levels of Navy capability’.8 
6.9 Similarly, Army notes that it ‘remains committed to achieving its SRP 
targets across the Defence Finance Management Plan without impacting 
capability’.9 The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) states: 
Air Force’s continued implementation of enduring reform, in 
partnership with the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) and 
Defence industry, enabled it to deliver SRP savings while 
meeting operational tasking, preparedness, and safety 
/airwothiness requirements. Change programs supporting the 
development of cost-conscious behaviours across the Air Force 
continued. Full achievement was limited by cost increases in 
aircraft sustainment, which could not be fully offset by 
operating and maintenance efficiencies.10 
Current status 
6.10 The SRP-related savings achieved in 2011-2012 are grouped into seven key 
areas: 
 Information and communications technology (ICT); 
 Smart sustainment; 
 Non-equipment procurement; 
 Workforce and shared services; 
 Reserves; 
 Logistics; and 
 
7  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 238. 
8  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 42. 
9  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 46. 
10  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 51. 
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 Other.11 
Information and communications technology 
6.11 According to the Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, Defence achieved a 
$215.8 million saving in the area of ICT reform by providing: 
…a simplified and modern ICT infrastructure that reduces 
maintenance costs, increases productivity and enables other 
reforms, through: 
 Remediation of ICT infrastructure; 
 Data centre migration; 
 Next generation desktop; and 
 Centralised processing and terrestrial communications.12 
Smart sustainment 
6.12 The Defence Annual Report 2011-2012 notes that $389.1 million in SRP 
savings were achieved in the area of smart sustainment. The report states 
that Defence is controlling equipment sustainment costs through: 
 Grouping contracts to generate efficiencies and reduce 
duplication; 
 Optimising the Navy’s Fleet Support Units as lead repair 
agencies for the fleet through the up-skilling of the Navy’s 
technical workforce; 
 Maximising contractual arrangements; 
 Streamlining usage and reducing active items in service; and 
 Better aligning facility usage with workforce requirements.13 
6.13 The Committee focused particularly on grouping contracts, optimising 
Navy’s Fleet Units and maximising contractual arrangements in its 
examination of this savings stream. 
Grouping contracts 
6.14 Defence told the Committee about how savings were achieved by 
grouping contracts to generate efficiencies and reduce duplication in the 
maritime sector: 
…we are grouping up contracts for the sustainment of groups of 
ships in order to make it more efficient in terms of how the work is 
conducted by contractors. With the previous system, we 
contracted individually for each maintenance period, and that was 
proving to be inefficient. While we were having a large number of 
 
11  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 239. 
12  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 239. 
13  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 239. 
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competitions, there were actually, in our assessment, not long 
enough periods of time for contractors to stabilise their workforce 
and plan properly. By introducing group maintenance contracts – 
they are five year contracts with the ability to extend them – that 
provides the contractor certainty and provides us a better basis for 
planning for maintenance in order to optimise that maintenance 
and reduce overall costs. So, with the first group maintenance 
contract for a similar amount of work to what we were doing 
previously through many, many contracts, the sort of saving that 
we achieved through that tender process was around a 15 to 20 per 
cent saving on the previous work.14 
Optimising Navy’s Fleet Support Units 
6.15 The Committee asked Defence to elaborate on how it was achieving 
savings through the up-skilling of Navy’s technical workforce to optimise 
Navy’s Fleet Support Units. Defence responded: 
The Navy’s Fleet Support Unit improvement program is about just 
that—actually improving and leveraging on the technical skills of 
the sailors that are in those shore based units. They are there to 
provide immediate support to the ships, so I would call that, in an 
Air Force sense, flight line or dockside repair. But, to improve their 
technical competency and agility to respond to Navy’s needs, 
there has been a reform program put in place to get better use out 
of them and therefore train them up, particularly in recognition of 
the landing helicopter dock capability that is coming in. I am sure 
that, if the Chief of Navy were here, he would be able to describe 
this a lot better than I can, but part of that is to provide them with 
a continual flow of repair work, and, in conjunction with the 
DMO, they will find commodities to send to the Fleet Support 
Units, just like the Fleet Support Unit would be a contractor, but 
an internal contractor, and that would then give them the baseline 
work to continue to develop these skills. A secondary function of 
the Fleet Support Unit is to then provide short-term operational 
relief to Navy ships’ complements whenever somebody cannot go 
on a particular operation. So it is quite a fundamental component 
of Navy capability and one that the Chief of Navy is wishing to get 
more out of.15 
 
 
14  Ms McKinnie, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 53. 
15  Air Vice Marshal Smith, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 53. 
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Maximising contractual arrangements 
6.16 In regard to maximising their contractual arrangements, Defence informed 
the Committee that it was doing a number of things: 
We have developed a more consistent approach to performance 
and productivity based contracting, so our new contracts will not 
only include performance requirements but will also include 
productivity requirements, so that over time we are seeking 
productivity improvement approaches to be offered by 
contractors. Additionally, we are working with contractors to 
renegotiate some of our contracts, particularly where in working 
with the contractors we have identified particular ways of 
business that we have been using that are driving costs, to modify 
our approaches to how we might be contracting for something. For 
example, we might be using key performance indicators that are 
driving incorrect performance in order for companies to meet their 
contractual obligations. A better set of performance indicators 
might actually drive better outcomes in terms of capability but at a 
lower cost.16 
Non-equipment procurement 
6.17 A further $147.7 million in SRP savings were achieved in the area of non-
equipment procurement in the 2011-2012 financial year. The Defence 
Annual Report 2011-2012 notes that this was done through: 
Improved demand management of travel, training, professional 
services and garrison support through: 
 Base Services Re-Tender; 
 Mess closures and consolidations including the conversion of 
Russell Messes to the Russell Conference Centre; and 
 Continued success of the online travel booking tool.17 
6.18 Defence elaborated on the specific areas where savings were made: 
Non-equipment procurement reform has over 50 initiatives, 
looking for greater efficiencies in various business categories such 
as travel, removals, professional services, garrison support and 
building maintenance. 
Key areas of reform contributing the to 2011-2012 financial year 
outcomes include unpacking options, online travel booking tool, 
 
16  Ms McKinnie, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 54. 
17  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 239. 
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mess consolidation and rationalisation in the procurement of office 
supplies and hardware items.18 
6.19 At a public hearing, Defence discussed in further detail how savings were 
being realised: 
…for all of these areas there are three areas we look at: policy – can 
we adjust our policies so that the delivery of that thing is cheaper; 
demand – can we reduce the amount of something we deliver; and 
contracting – can we get a better price on the market for what we 
deliver?19 
6.20 In regard to removals, Defence told the Committee how these three areas 
were resulting in savings: 
In a removals case, due to policies that the three services have 
been introducing we are seeing a lower incidence of removals 
because we have moved to three-year back-to-back postings where 
possible. That reduces removals costs because of a lower incidence 
of removals. 
We did some work with the removal contractors a year or so ago 
to try and get a better price. We extracted some efficiencies from 
the contract. As an example, what we found was that when some 
people are removed, their preference is when they arrive at a new 
location to unpack their own gear out of the boxes; whereas we 
were paying, in all cases, for the removalists to unpack. In some 
areas, we were paying for an unpacking service that then was not 
being delivered, because the preference of the individual ADF 
family was that they wanted to unpack their own furniture et 
cetera. Now, we are a bit cleverer about how we do that. If the 
ADF family wishes to unpack their own gear, then we do not pay 
that amount to the removalists.20 
6.21 Defence discussed another example of non-equipment procurement 
savings, noting that they were currently retendering for the contracts to 
provide services at military bases. Defence told the Committee that this 
includes: 
…all of the living accommodation services. We do that through a 
heavily outsourced model. The majority of that work is done by 
outsourced contractors. I currently have 21 contracts around the 
country that cover the totality of the services at the 72-odd bases. 
We are in the process of retendering for those services at the 
 
18  Department of Defence, Submission No. 5, p. 12. 
19  Mr Grzeskowiak, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 30. 
20  Mr Grzeskowiak, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 30. 
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moment. Under the strategic reform program in 2009 there were a 
number of savings lines declared against the types of services that 
are provided. One of the mechanisms that we are using to try to 
achieve savings is the retendering process to drive efficiencies in 
the way we deliver those services and also to look at the level of 
service we provide and, where possible, rationalise the level of 
service and try to see if we can reduce the demand for some 
services.21 
Workforce and shared services 
6.22 In the area of workforce and shared services, Defence achieved $155.8 
million in SRP-related savings. The Defence Annual Report 2011-2012 notes 
that this was done through: 
 Conversion of contractors to Australian Public Service (APS) 
positions; 
 Rationalised customer service centres; 
 Civilianisation of ADF to APS positions; 
 Leaning of base estate and garrison support; 
 Reduction in contract management costs; 
 Rationalised libraries; 
 Consolidation of mail and records; and 
 Finance, human resources and non-equipment procurements 
shared services reform planning and implementation.22 
6.23 In examining these savings, the Committee focused particularly on 
conversion of contractors, civilianisation of ADF positions, and leaning of 
base estate and garrison support. 
Conversion of contractors 
6.24 Defence informed the Committee of the ways that savings were being 
achieved by converting contractors to APS positions: 
In the Defence Budget Audit conducted in 2008 McKinsey and Co 
identified that there were a large number of roles undertaken by 
contractors that could be equally undertaken by an APS employee 
without negatively impacting on capability. McKinsey advised 
that by converting these roles, up to 30 per cent of the contractor 
cost could be saved. 
The roles identified were positions filled by individual contractors 
and primarily involved filling a line position within the 
organisation. Positions/roles would only be converted where 
 
21  Mr Grzeskowiak, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 29. 
22  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 239. 
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there were suitable people in the market place wishing to fulfil the 
role as an APS employee. 
The types of positions previously filled by a contractor that have 
been converted to an APS position include, but are not limited to: 
a medical practitioner with work health and safety expertise, 
finance analysts, ICT analysts, project managers and scientific 
support. Contractor positions that were part of a larger 
outsourcing or service-provision initiative were excluded from 
conversion as the terms of the contract would preclude this 
activity.23 
6.25 Defence further noted that there were non-financial benefits to 
maintaining workforce flexibility in terms of engaging contractors: 
Defence constantly needs to be able to respond to a fast-moving 
and changing labour market environment. Changing the 
integrated workforce mix has enabled Defence to deliver a cost-
effective, flexible and adaptable workforce. In addition, non-
financial benefits have included: a better corporate memory, 
expanded career paths for ongoing employees, better compliance 
with legislation and employment agreements where the role has 
supervisory duties, and a better understanding of the ongoing 
business needs of the organisation.24 
6.26 In light of the financial and other benefits, when asked why it had relied 
on contractors for so long, Defence responded that the use of contractors: 
…depends on what area. The reason can vary. For instance, it is 
not uncommon to engage contractors in the ICT area where you 
want people for a particular period with a particular skill set. It 
does not make sense to employ people permanently for what 
might be a temporary need. Contractors are best suited to that. If 
you are planning in the public service and you increase your full-
time staff equivalent by one person, you normally work on the 
assumption that that will cost you about $125,000 a year. That is an 
all-up cost of salary, superannuation and the like. Now, obviously, 
the actual cost varies depending on level and all of that. But as an 
average cost, that is normally what you work at in our 
department. In another department, the average cost might be 
higher or lower. A contractor is significantly more than that. 
However, you cannot simply make a decision to change all 
 
23  Department of Defence, Submission No. 5, p. 13. 
24  Department of Defence, Submission No. 5, p. 13. 
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contractors to public servants because there is a trade-off in 
flexibility in respect of contractors and public servants.25 
Civilianisation of ADF positions 
6.27 The Committee asked Defence how savings were being achieved through 
civilianisation of ADF positions. Defence responded: 
This was one of the original initiatives from Strategic Reform 
Program in 2009. At that time, we were critically looking at some 
roles in the ADF that might be most cost effectively performed by 
Australian Public Service people. Typically, they would be more 
back office administrative roles. There has been an active program 
over the last two to three years to turn some roles from ADF 
performed roles into APS performed roles. That is what we term a 
“civilianisation program”.  
The driver behind it was that the cost of employing an APS person 
is significantly less than the cost of employing an ADF person—
something of the order of a 30 to 40 per cent difference, depending 
on which rank you might be looking at. Therefore, it was one of 
the cost-reduction initiatives in that program. I do not have with 
me the detail of how many roles have been civilianised, but the 
program is coming near the end of its time now.26 
6.28 Defence elaborated on the reasons why civilian APS staff can, in some 
cases, cost less than uniformed personnel: 
The savings come essentially from the cost of employing the type 
of person. If you look rank for rank, generally the ADF are paid 
more—for very good reasons. Also, there is an overhead 
associated with an ADF person in terms of the health care that is 
provided to them, in terms of the subsidised housing that is 
provided to them and in terms of needing to equip them to do 
their role—simple things like the provision of uniforms. It is more 
expensive to employ a military person than a civilian person. The 
rationale behind this initiative at the time was very much that if 
we could do work with civilians then we should, because it is a 
lower cost workforce model overall. I think the program is actually 
reaching its end probably this year or next year.27 
6.29 Subsequently, Defence provided some examples of savings made by 
civilianising ADF positions, drawn from the Defence Financial Costing 
Manual (FINMAN 4): 
 
25  Mr Richardson, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 31. 
26  Mr Grzeskowiak, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 44. 
27  Mr Grzeskowiak, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 44. 
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In 2009, FINMAN 4 provided average costings by rank and APS 
level and includes salary, accrued costs, variable on-costs and 
fixed on-costs. To determine the savings potential Defence used 
the differences between salary, accrued cost and variable on-costs. 
Accrued costs are primarily superannuation, but include a small 
component to cover annual leave and long service leave. Variable 
on-costs cover a wide range of items but notably include 
allowances, housing, education and training and ICT support. 
Fixed on-costs, which include items such as buildings, utility costs 
and security were not used as no civilianisation actions resulted in 
the complete closure of a Defence facility.28 
6.30 Defence provided an example of the scale of savings made in regard to 
two specific positions that are being civilianised: 
In the case of pay clerks, in 2009, FINMAN 4 costed a sergeant as 
follows: $61,843 pay, $22,885 accrued costs and $55,195 for variable 
on-costs giving a total annual cost of $139,924. The equivalent 
position in the APS is an APS3. The 2009 FINMAN 4 costed an 
APS3 as follows: $53,239 pay, $9,892 accrued costs and $7,907 for 
variable on-costs, giving a total annual cost of $71,037. In this case, 
civilianising the position saves $87,055. 
In the case of the secretariat role, in 2009 FINMAN 4 costed a 
Major as follows: $93,395 pay, $32,802 accrued costs, $57,183 
variable on-costs, giving a total annual cost of $183,380. The 
equivalent position in the APS is APS6. In 2009, FINMAN 4 costed 
an APS6 as follows: $74,564 pay, $13,854 accrued costs and $7907 
variable on-costs, giving an annual cost of $96,325. In this case, 
civilianising the position saves $87,055.29 
6.31 In regard to managing this process for the personnel concerned, Defence 
told the Committee that: 
As part of the implementation design, ADF members that 
occupied a position that was identified for civilianisation were 
offered the opportunity to leave the ADF and transfer with the 
position into the APS. This was entirely voluntary with ADF 
members individually assessing their work/life stage making 
decisions accordingly. Approximately 20 per cent of the ADF 
members in civilianised positions chose to transfer with the 
position. 
 
28  Department of Defence, Submission No. 5, pp. 39-40. 
29  Department of Defence, Submission No. 5, p. 40. 
76 REVIEW OF THE DEFENCE ANNUAL REPORT 2011-2012 
 
Where an ADF member chose not to transfer with a position they 
were posted to a new position, in accordance with their career 
management plan. In some cases voluntary redundancies were 
also offered. Once a position had been civilianised and the ADF 
member posted, workforce rebalancing to reach new guidance was 
achieved mainly through natural attrition.30 
Reserves 
6.32 The Defence Annual Report 2011-2012 states that $46.7 million was saved in 
the area of Reserves, and that these savings were made through: 
 Reduction in the use of Reservists; 
 Reduction of Army personnel on High Readiness Reserve; and 
 Reduction in the frequency of training.31 
6.33 Defence informed the Committee of how it was making reforms in the 
area of Reserves: 
The program with reserves was about restructuring the way that 
reserves are used. If you go back to the Pappas [Report] 
recommendation in the Defence budget audit, it was about better 
integration of the reserves into the permanent forces. I think it is 
fair to say that the model that the Pappas consultants used was the 
model that Air Force was implementing – a more integrated model 
where there was a seamless service career from full time to part 
time arrangements and you could swap around. Each service had 
different models for operating and in the reserves space the largest 
component of the reserves belong to the Army. The Chief of Army 
is not here to address this, but the cost reductions of the initial 
years were achieved through some policy changes. For example, 
there was a requirement, largely in the Army, to have a reservist 
comply with their material readiness requirement twice per year. 
That drives costs. The Army assessed that the permanent forces in 
the Air Force, for example, only had to do it once a year. That was 
a policy change and that reduced costs for operating and 
maintaining the reserves. 
6.34 Furthermore, Defence noted: 
There were a number of other policy tools being put in place to try 
and improve the cost of delivering reserves – like the cost of 
training services. Could we modularise the training to allow a 
reservist to step through small packages of training? If we could 
 
30  Department of Defence, Submission No. 5, p. 40. 
31  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 239. 
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do that, we would minimise our loss rate, because often people hit 
a large training block at a time when they cannot get away from 
their full time employment and lose interest in committing.32 
6.35 Another SRP-related initiative in relation to the Reserves was outlined by 
Defence: 
Another initiative was to try and pick up a greater conversion—
people leaving the Army and going into the reserves. Those 
initiatives are starting to get traction, but in the last 18 months or 
so the approach to finding a structural—and therefore more 
capable—way of using our reserves has been redeveloped. I do not 
know whether the committee has been briefed about Plan 
SUAKIN. I am not the best person to talk about Plan SUAKIN, but 
it is a complete rethink of the way reserves will be utilised to 
support ADF capability. In a nutshell, it is going to introduce a 
continuum of employment conditions, from part-time to full-time. 
There are about five or six different arrangements. Through that, 
we will get a better utilisation of reserves and achieve the Pappas 
objective and the cost reduction targets.33 
Logistics 
6.36 A small SRP-related saving of $300 000 was made through reform of 
Defence’s logistics. The Defence Annual Report 2011-2012 notes that these 
saving were made through: 
Rationalisation of wholesale storage and distribution 
arrangements including second pass approval for delivery of the 
program.34 
Other 
6.37 An additional SRP-related saving of $285.4 million was listed in the 
Defence Annual Report 2011-2012 under the heading of ‘Other’. The report 
states that this saving was made through ‘changes in the way financial risk 
is managed.’35 
6.38 Defence elaborated on what this ‘Other’ category encompassed: 
The program, when we started, was about identifying savings. We 
identified the savings and then took the money out of the budgets. 
All the areas affected then had to run to the new budget, and there 
 
32  Air Vice Marshal Smith, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 49. 
33  Air Vice Marshal Smith, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 50. 
34  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 239. 
35  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 239. 
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is an incentive on all of the various groups to achieve their budget 
outcomes because they do not have the money to spend otherwise. 
That is an important feature of this particular program. It is 
sometimes misunderstood. It is not the case that there is a budget 
of 100 at the start of the year and that it is expected that it will be 
brought down to a lower number; the budget is the lower number. 
When we do our reporting, as we do here, what we are really 
repeating is the amounts that we took out of the budgets, So what 
we are really saying is: “Did everyone live within their means? 
Did they achieve their new budgets?” If they achieved their new 
budgets, then they saved an amount of money. So when we put 
these reports together, what we are really reporting is whether 
there has been any blowout in budgets. If a group was to spend 
more than the recent budget amount, it would follow that they 
had not achieved the savings.36 
6.39 Defence subsequently told the Committee how this overview of the 
program results in changes in the way that financial risk is managed: 
When we commenced this program… it was roughly $20 billion 
and there was something like $5 billion which sat in the “other” 
category across that period. That “other” category was, in fact, a 
combination of moneys that were unallocated within Defence at 
the time, moneys that when we did our 2009 White Paper across 
time were seen to be not needed to be set aside for a rainy day or 
for events that might happen. We would then risk-manage that 
differently. Rather than having a fund set aside for “just in case” 
we said we would run “lean”; we would run to the wire; we 
would run against specific budgets. 
One of the other things we did at that time was allocate all the 
budgets from the centre to all the groups. There is no money 
sitting in the centre of Defence. Before the 2009 SRP time there 
were pockets of money held centrally. This line was about running 
lean, and to incentivise the organisation to achieve this we took 
away the option of having a safety valve. That is what that risk 
management line was; it was to take that money away. Don’t 
forget – all the moneys that were taken were reapplied back into 
the organisation to higher priorities. Rather than having a set of 
funds available just in case a priority came up, we allocated them 
all. That is what that [risk management] line represents. It does not 
represent some new activity, it represents an event that had 
 
36  Mr Prior, Department of Defence, Transcript, 15 March 2013, p. 46. 
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occurred back at the beginning of the SRP, and this is just 
recording how we are going each year against that.37 
Committee comment 
6.40 The Committee notes that Defence appears to be tracking well this 
financial year against the SRP savings outlined at the beginning of the 
program in 2009.  
6.41 While the Committee is pleased that Defence has included a separate 
section in its Annual Report in which it reports only on the SRP, the 
Committee is of the view that this section should contain more detail. 
6.42 In its current form, the SRP section is very light on details, to the extent 
that it is not possible to gain a clear understanding of how Defence is 
making the savings it claims under the SRP. The Committee is of the view 
that this inhibits public understanding of the ways Defence is seeking to 
manage its finances. Defence’s annual reporting is examined in greater 
detail in Chapter Seven. 
6.43 In terms of expanding the reporting on the SRP, the Committee is of the 
view that Defence could, as a matter of course, include the type of details 
shared during the course of this review in its reporting on the SRP. For 
instance, it would be possible for the SRP section of future annual reports 
to include a detailed breakdown of how specific savings are being 
achieved under each stream. As an example, in response to questions 
asked by the Committee, Defence outlined exactly how it was achieving 
savings in the Workforce and Shared Services stream, through the 
conversion of contractors to APS positions and the conversion of uniform 
to APS positions. 
6.44 Furthermore, despite raising this issue with Defence during the Review of 
the Defence Annual Report 2010-2011, the Committee is still not able to 
ascertain the cost of delivering these savings from the reporting on the 
SRP contained in the Defence Annual Report 2011-2012. Savings achieved 
through the conversion of contactors to APS positions surely come with 
costs attached, and yet the Annual Report gives no indication as to what 
these costs might be, or what these costs amount to. Any future reporting 
on the SRP should include reporting on the costs of delivering such 
savings. 
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Recommendation 2 
 The Committee recommends that the Defence Annual Report include 
detailed information on how savings are being achieved under each 
stream of the Strategic Reform Program. 
 
 
 
  
  
 7 
 
Other issues 
7.1 During the course of the Review, a number of other issues were dealt with 
that do not fit into the broad subject areas the Committee resolved to 
examine during its consideration of the Defence Annual Report 2011-2012. 
These issues will be discussed in this Chapter. 
7.2 These issues fall into three broad categories: 
 Strengthening Defence oversight; 
 The Parliamentary Defence Engagement Program; and 
 The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Project. 
Strengthening Defence oversight 
7.3 In a submission to this Review, Mr James Brown argued that there were a 
number of issues which prevented effective oversight of the Defence 
organisation. These issues largely stem from the nature of Defence’s 
annual reporting, and Mr Brown’s evidence focused on both the perceived 
shortcomings of Defence’s reporting, and recommended ways to improve 
it. 
The Defence Annual Report 
7.4 When it comes to departmental annual reporting, Mr Brown noted that, 
ideally: 
The Defence Annual Report should allow the Parliament to gauge 
how good the [Australian Defence Organisation (ADO)] is and 
how effective defence and strategic policy has been. At least it 
should provide clear indication of whether the ADO is improving 
performance or not. But in its current form the Defence Annual 
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Report lags behind our allies in its commitment to transparency 
and detail.1 
7.5 Mr Brown told the Committee that this was particularly concerning in the 
area of gauging preparedness: 
The issue I have is that this report makes it very difficult for 
Defence to be accountable to Parliament. There is not a lot of 
information with which you can measure preparedness for 
defence, readiness issues or some of the deeper, more structural 
and institutional problems that might be happening within the 
ADO.2 
7.6 As such, Mr Brown raised a number of concerns about the nature of 
Defence’s Annual Report, noting particularly that it is ‘less transparent and 
detailed than similar reporting in the UK, US, Canada and New Zealand.’ 
Of particular concern to Mr Brown was: 
…the methodology for reporting department performance. The 
ADO assesses its 20 departmental and administered programs 
using a system of one, two and three ticks. 
The three tick system is an exceptionally crude performance 
measurement methodology for a government department with 
105,000 employees and an annual budget of $24.2 billion. It is not 
clear what the performance targets are, how they are devised, or 
how performance is assessed. Where targets are not achieved, it is 
not possible to discern by how much performance is deficient. 
Because of these limitations (and other data inconsistencies from 
year to year) it is very difficult to track defence performance over 
time in any meaningful way.3 
7.7 Furthermore, Mr Brown characterised what reporting there is as ‘overly 
optimistic’, noting that it does not serve to highlight risks to performance. 
For example: 
…in the Defence Annual Report 2011-12, Navy’s amphibious fleet 
received a full three ticks for performance. This rating, however, 
does not make it clear that amphibious ships HMAS Manoora and 
Kanimbla had been decommissioned and HMAS Tobruk was 
being extensively risk-managed to the point where it is doubtful 
she could sustain an operational deployment of any seriousness.4 
 
1  Mr James Brown, Submission No. 1, p. 3. 
2  Mr Brown, Transcript, 16 May 2013, p. 1. 
3  Mr James Brown, Submission No. 1, p. 3. 
4  Mr James Brown, Submission No. 1, p. 4. 
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7.8 Mr Brown highlighted another example of what he calls optimistic 
reporting: 
In the Defence Annual Report 2010-2011, the amphibious fleet 
recorded two ticks for performance – “targets mostly met and any 
issues are being managed”. Two of the three ships had actually 
been put on an operational pause for an extensive period after a 
fire on one ship left it drifting and in peril. During a large part of 
the 2010-11 reporting period Navy had no amphibious capability 
at all.5 
7.9 Defence responded that it will ‘will continue to review its approach to 
performance reporting in considering the preparation’ of its next annual 
report, noting: 
Defence is committed to performance reporting that reflects in a 
balanced way both the achievements of the Australian Defence 
Organisation and its current and future challenges. 
It should be noted that in addition to the three-ticks performance 
reporting in the 2011- 2012 Defence Annual Report, the Report 
includes several types of statistical performance data that allow a 
more granular assessment of performance. These include flying 
hours for aircraft types across all three Services and readiness data 
for Navy fleet units. In these examples both the actual 
performance and the relevant performance targets are included.6 
7.10 Mr Brown put forward his view that this ‘overly optimistic’ reporting has 
led to poor public perceptions of Defence as an organisation: 
Despite being a highly professional organisation, the ADO often 
appears to lurch from crisis to scandal. This perception is often 
fostered by a defensive approach to the release of information and 
overly optimistic and positive reporting. The Sub-Committee 
should encourage the ADO to be more balanced in its engagement 
with the Parliament and public, and to be more self-critical and 
less risk-averse in the release of information and fostering of 
professional debate.7 
7.11 To remedy this situation, Mr Brown recommended that Australia move 
towards the style of defence reporting currently used in the UK: 
In looking at other defence forces around the world and other 
defence organisations, it is quite clear that some of them use their 
reporting as an opportunity to flag critical issues and critical 
 
5  Mr James Brown, Submission No. 1, p. 4. 
6  Department of Defence, Submission No. 6, p. 4. 
7  Mr James Brown, Submission No. 1, p. 11. 
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shortages. The United Kingdom, for example, in their annual 
reporting take the opportunity to list where they are critically 
short of personnel. There are arguments for why you would and 
would not do that. But when I look through this report I see 
language that is not entirely useful and I think it is a cultural and 
institutional trait within Defence. I would hope that you would 
recommend them to take note of that and address it.8 
7.12 Mr Brown compared this style of reporting to that adopted in similar 
countries: 
However, these problems of defence reporting are not so apparent 
in the US, NZ, Canada, and the UK where there is a more 
encouraging commitment to defence transparency. Defence annual 
reporting in the UK, for example, highlights operational pinch 
points, critical personnel shortages, and shows where force 
elements are critically weak. In the annual report of the NZ 
Department of Defence and Defence Force there is a frank 
assessment of defence capabilities and granular reporting on the 
availability of major weapons platforms. The NZ Defence Report 
also uses a performance measurement methodology to report on 
the relative readiness levels of the NZDF without breaching 
operational security. Under the New Zealand model, it is very 
clear whether the New Zealand Defence Force is meeting 
readiness targets or not.9 
7.13 Defence responded that its annual reporting conforms with the guidelines 
set out by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet: 
Defence's public reporting conforms with the Annual Report 
performance reporting required by the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet and approved by the Joint Committee of 
Public Accounts and Audit under subsections 63(2) and 70(2) of 
the Public Service Act 1999. It should be noted that in addition to 
the three-ticks performance reporting in the 2011-2012 Defence 
Annual Report, the Report includes several types of statistical 
performance data that allow a more granular assessment of 
performance. These include flying hours for aircraft types across 
all three Services, as well as readiness and availability 
performance data for Navy fleet units. In these examples both the 
 
8  Mr Brown, Transcript, 16 May 2013, p. 2. 
9  Mr James Brown, Submission No. 1, p. 4. 
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actual performance and the relevant performance targets are 
included.10 
7.14 Mr Brown further noted that New Zealand’s reporting methodology 
manages to provide this information without ‘divulging any operational 
security information.’ Mr Brown suggested that: 
There could be some good work to be done there. I do not know 
whether it would be a public method of reporting – it might be an 
in camera method of reporting – but a more institutionalised and 
granular way of letting you know ether or not Defence is hitting its 
targets.11 
7.15 Nonetheless, Defence noted that security classifications made it difficult to 
report publicly on force readiness: 
With regard to routine reporting, Defence provides regular 
quarterly reports on readiness (also called preparedness) to the 
Minister for Defence. Because of the sensitive nature of 
assessments on Defence's ability to undertake tasks as directed by 
the Government, most preparedness and capability reporting is 
classified. Advice on capability issues arising outside the reporting 
cycle is also provided directly to the Minister by the responsible 
Service Chief.12 
Publishing statistics 
7.16 Another means of strengthening oversight of the ADO suggested by Mr 
Brown was through the routine publication of important Defence-related 
statistics. Mr Brown outlined his arguments in support of this to the 
Committee at a public hearing: 
The second suggestion I have made is that this committee 
encourage the defence organisation to more routinely publish 
statistical information for a number of reasons. Firstly, so that my 
job as a researcher is easier. Secondly, so that both the public and 
Parliament can do their own assessment of where defence is at. 
Thirdly, so that defence personnel themselves can access this 
information. I believe that it is just as hard within the organisation 
to get your hands on statistical information. For example, it took 
me four months to work out how many Army officers have a 
tertiary degree. That is not very controversial information in itself. 
It does not give us a huge degree of insight into how good the 
 
10  Department of Defence, Submission No. 6, p. 2. 
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Army is, but it is an indicator of how professional our Army 
Officer Corps is. Four months later I have been given that data by 
Defence. It turns out that, from their records, 20 per cent of Army 
officers have a degree—a surprisingly low number. It is a number, 
I believe, cannot be correct given the number that go through the 
Australian Defence Force Academy, and Command and Staff 
College at the Australian National University. An initiative to 
convince Defence to publish more of this type of statistical 
information would be entirely useful. There is a good model for 
this. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence has an analytical 
statistical agency, which basically has economists, statisticians and 
researchers who work to put together this kind of information and 
publish it for public, parliament and defence usage.13 
7.17 As a result, Mr Brown noted that: 
The ADO has been slow to embrace the age of open government 
and Australia often lags behind our allies when it comes to 
defence transparency. The Sub-Committee should encourage, and 
if necessary seek to legislate, for the ADO to routinely publish 
more statistical data and defence information. Additionally, the 
ADO should be encouraged to publish more of its reports and 
surveys rather than waiting for the public to request them through 
the freedom of information process, or for members to request 
information through questions on notice.14 
7.18 Defence noted that it was already publishing statistics, and was seeking to 
publish more information: 
The Defence Annual Report (DAR) is Defence's primary vehicle for 
the release of statistical information pertaining to the Defence 
portfolio. The DAR contains many statistics comparable to those 
accessible via the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence's statistical 
agency (Defence Analytical Services and Advice), including 
statistics on Defence staffing and finance. Defence also releases 
statistical information comparable to the United Kingdom 
Ministry of Defence's statistical agency on its website. For 
example, the operations section of this website includes statistics 
on Australian Defence Force casualties. 
Defence is also seeking to place more information, including 
information sought regularly by Parliamentary Committees 
through Questions on Notice, on its Information Publication 
 
13  Mr Brown, Transcript, 16 May 2013, p. 2. 
14  Mr James Brown, Submission No. 1, p. 10. 
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Scheme website. Responses to Questions on Notice, available from 
the Australian Parliamentary website, also contain considerable 
statistical data for researchers and the general public.15 
Reviews of major operations 
7.19 Another means of fostering greater Parliamentary oversight and thus 
public understanding of Defence and its activities that was raised during 
this Review was through the conduct of post-campaign assessments. 
7.20 Mr Brown made the following comment on efforts at reviewing 
operations: 
Concurrently, the ADO is transitioning from a high tempo decade 
of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor and Solomon 
Islands. These operations need to be reviews and the ADO does 
not have a good record in reviewing its own operations. The 
Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) concluded in 2011 that 
Defence’s ability to learn from operations was “patchy and 
fragmented”, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) had no central 
repository for operational evaluations, and that until 2009 Defence 
had reviewed only 5 of its 17 operations. The ANAO concluded 
then that this “limited the ADF’s capacity to assess its performance 
against the objectives set by the Government when it committed 
the ADF to action”.16 
7.21 Mr Brown thus argued that: 
…it is particularly important that we review how successful 
[recent operations have] been on a number of levels: the military 
strategy, the operational effectiveness and the tactical lessons that 
we have learned as well.17  
7.22 Defence noted that it currently has a campaign assessment process in 
place: 
Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) employs a 
campaign approach to managing large scale, enduring ADF 
operations. As part of the campaign approach to operations, 
HQJOC conducts campaign assessments for designated 
operations. The campaign assessment assesses progress against set 
operational objectives, highlights risk and informs Chief of Joint 
Operations' decision making.  
 
15  Department of Defence, Submission No. 6, p. 3. 
16  Mr James Brown, Submission No. 1, p. 6. 
17  Mr Brown, Transcript, 16 May 2013, pp. 2-3. 
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For example, the ADF's operations in Afghanistan, under 
Operation SLIPPER, are assessed quarterly. In line with the 
HQJOC campaign plan, the Afghanistan campaign assessment is 
primarily focused on Uruzgan Province. The Operation SLIPPER 
campaign assessment draws upon a wide base of reporting that 
includes inputs from Combined Team - Uruzgan, the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) chain of command, and other 
wider sources. This reporting is used to provide both contextual 
background and the assessment of specific measures of 
effectiveness used to assess progress.18 
7.23 Furthermore, Mr Brown suggested that these reviews pay particular 
attention to implementing the lessons learned from these operations, and 
that the reviews contain some sort of public component.19 
7.24 In response, Defence informed the Committee that it: 
…believes that the current reporting, post activity evaluation and 
lessons learned processes of the ADF provides suitable 
opportunity for the Government to evaluate operations and for 
Defence to develop new or revised strategies and doctrine and 
update tactics, techniques and procedures. Public reviews such as 
those recommended would carry the risk of providing potential 
adversaries with information of the ADF's strengths and 
weaknesses without necessarily providing further information of 
value.20 
7.25 Furthermore, Defence stated that some information on the various 
assessments of the campaign are made available to the public: 
ISAF conducts its own assessments ofthe overall campaign in 
Afghanistan and reports on these regularly through North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO). At the appropriate time, NATO 
releases information publicly, the US Commander provides 
updates to the media and provides testimonies to the US 
Congress. Furthermore, ISAF provides briefings to the media on 
operations, including how ISAF assesses the overall campaign. An 
extract is available on the ISAF website. 
Finally, the Minister for Defence, Minister Smith, provides regular 
updates to Parliament on the progress of the mission in 
Afghanistan. Regular updates to Parliament in 2013 have included 
operational reviews, updates on operational incidents and 
 
18  Department of Defence, Submission No. 6, p. 1. 
19  Mr Brown, Transcript, 16 May 2013, p. 3 and Mr James Brown, Submission No. 1, p. 11. 
20  Department of Defence, Submission No. 6, p. 1. 
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detainee management, as well as transition progress in 
Afghanistan.21 
Committee comment 
7.26 The Committee is of the view that Defence’s annual reporting, as it 
currently stands, does not provide sufficient detail on performance or on 
the readiness of the ADF. While the Committee acknowledges that the 
Defence Annual Report is not the only place where Defence’s performance is 
examined, it could still be expanded to include more information. 
7.27 The Committee agrees with Mr Brown’s contention that reporting tends to 
be overly optimistic, and that Defence could be using its annual reporting 
to flag potential future issues and operational pinch points.  
7.28 The Committee shares Mr Brown’s concerns about the three ticks 
methodology for reporting performance. Not only does this method not 
shed much light on the extent to which Defence is fulfilling its functions, it 
also makes it difficult to monitor performance between annual reports as 
no indication is given as to how the number of ticks is arrived at. 
7.29 As a result, the Committee sees considerable value in expanding the 
information included in the Defence annual report. This should include, at 
a minimum:  
 the specific performance targets which underlie key performance 
indicators and deliverables; 
 how performance is assessed in relation to these targets; and 
 when targets are not achieved, specific details on the reasons.  
The expanded performance reporting framework should draw on 
international experience in the capabilities acquisition and sustainment 
arena. 
 
 
21  Department of Defence, Submission No. 6, pp. 1-2. 
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Recommendation 3 
 The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence enhance 
its public reporting by: 
 Developing a more precise method for reporting performance 
on capabilities acquisition and sustainment, which would 
detail: 
⇒ Specific performance targets; 
⇒ how performance is assessed in relation to these targets; and 
⇒ the specific reasons why targets are, or are not, achieved;  
 Including some detail on emerging areas of concern and 
potential future issues; 
 Enhancing its reporting on the Defence budget and its 
implications for capabilities acquisition and sustainment; 
 Undergoing a periodic review conducted by independent 
experts, similar to the United States’ Quadrennial Defense 
Review; and 
 Including information on operational readiness.   
 
The Australian Defence Force Parliamentary Program 
7.30 One of the key challenges to strengthened Parliamentary oversight of 
Defence highlighted in Mr Brown’s submission was the lack of military 
experience of many Australian parliamentarians. Mr Brown noted that 
while: 
Prior military service is not a precondition for developing a deep 
understanding of defence… it is a good start. As warfare becomes 
more technical and specialised, knowledge of the military becomes 
harder to access. A parliamentarian may form views on health 
policy through personal visits to a hospital, but absent a period of 
military service, most parliamentarians are unlikely to have 
encountered the military in anything other than a ceremonial 
role.22 
7.31 Mr Brown noted that while nearly eight per cent of Australia’s 
parliamentarians do have military experience: 
 
22  Mr James Brown, Submission No. 1, pp. 8-9. 
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…in 50 per cent of cases military service has been limited to brief 
stints in reserve training units. Not a single member of the 43rd 
Parliament has served in a combat position, only two have 
experience in the ADF post-9/11.23 
7.32 One highly successful means of remedying this is the Australian Defence 
Force Parliamentary Program (ADFPP). The Defence website gives a 
background to the genesis of this program: 
In late 2000, there was a growing awareness that the number of 
parliamentarians who had direct experience with the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF) had diminished markedly. Defence took the 
position that it needed to increase parliamentarian’s exposure to 
the ADF and provide them with an opportunity to gain an insight 
into the ADF and its capabilities. In turn, this was expected to 
assist parliamentarians in the facilitation of a more fulsome 
Defence debate on issues of national security and budgetary 
expenditure, issues which had attracted increased attention 
through the nineties as a result of heightened world events.24 
7.33 Defence’s website elaborated on the role of the program: 
The stated aim of the ADFPP was, and remains, to provide 
Senators and Members of Parliament with practical experiences of 
the ADF so that they can play a more informed and constructive 
part in the Defence debate. The program has the following 
objectives:  
 provide an understanding of a unit’s role and missions,  
 provide an opportunity to experience life as a service person, 
and  
 provide an awareness and understanding of Defence 
capabilities, personnel and management issues.25 
7.34 Since the program’s inception in 2001, 293 placements have been 
undertaken by members of the Federal Parliament. These placements have 
been in a variety of operational areas, and Defence offers some examples 
from the 2013 program: 
During 2013, 19 attachment options are offered. The Middle East 
Gulf Region and Afghanistan operational options remain at the 
forefront of the program. Activities for this option include 
undertaking an operational naval patrol on an ANZAC frigate in 
 
23  Mr James Brown, Submission No. 1, p. 9. 
24  Department of Defence website, Defence Parliamentary Engagement Program: History, viewed 11 
June 2013, <http://www.defence.gov.au/adfpp/history.htm>.  
25  Department of Defence website, Defence Parliamentary Engagement Program: History, viewed 11 
June 2013, <http://www.defence.gov.au/adfpp/history.htm>. 
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the Gulf of Aden, or engaging in activities with service personnel 
on deployment at Tarin Kot and Kandahar in Afghanistan.  
Attachments to other Areas of Operation include the longstanding 
Border Protection activity to the North and the ADF’s Regional 
Assistance to the Solomon Islands, which will complete this year. 
Options within the three services in Australia include attachment 
options to Navy’s Fleet Base West with a focus on the Collins 
submarine, to Army’s major firepower exercise CHONG JU, or to 
Air Force's Royal Australian Air Force Base Williamtown, home of 
the F/A 18 Hornet and the new Wedgetail Airborne Early 
Warning and Control aircraft.26 
7.35 Given the success of the program in fostering a deeper understanding of 
the issues faced by Defence, and Defence’s uniformed personnel in 
particular, Mr Brown recommended that it be expanded into other areas of 
the ADO where Members of Parliament may have fewer opportunities to 
engage: 
The ADF Parliamentary Program… is highly successful (34 per 
cent of the current parliament has completed at least one rotation). 
However, the tactical focus of the program makes it more akin to a 
work experience program for politicians than a mechanism of 
parliamentary oversight. Parliamentarians wear military uniforms, 
complete tactical tasks, and are awarded special boomerang 
insignia when they complete multiple placements. Whilst the 
program helps make life in ADF units familiar to 
parliamentarians, a more mature program of defence fact finding 
and inspection is needed. This program should prioritise visits to 
consider strategic and operational issues at Headquarters Joint 
Operations Command, Russell HQ, and the [Defence Materiel 
Organisation].27 
Committee comment 
7.36 The Committee recognises the value of the Defence Parliamentary 
Engagement Program. This Program has been of immense value in terms 
of informing parliamentarians about the lives and activities of Australia’s 
servicemen and women, and the Committee is very supportive of the 
Program’s continuation. 
 
26  Department of Defence website, Defence Parliamentary Engagement Program: History, viewed 11 
June 2013, <http://www.defence.gov.au/adfpp/history.htm>. 
27  Mr James Brown, Submission No, 1, p. 9. 
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7.37 Nevertheless, the Committee would like to see the Defence Parliamentary 
Engagement Program extended into other areas. The Committee sees 
value in extending the Program to include placements with the 
Department of Defence, with a particular focus on strategic policy and the 
DMO. 
 
Recommendation 4 
 The Committee recommends that the Defence Parliamentary 
Engagement Program include placements with the Department of 
Defence policy areas and the Defence Materiel Organisation. 
 
Joint Strike Fighter 
7.38 In its Review of the Defence Annual Report 2010-2011, in light of the 
conflicting perspectives presented to it on the cost, schedule and 
capabilities of the JSF, the Committee resolved to maintain a focus on the 
project to ensure that it does provide Australia with ongoing regional air 
superiority in a cost-effective and timely fashion.  
7.39 The Defence Annual Report 2011-2012 states that: 
Lockheed Martin is contracted to the United States Government 
for the development and production of the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter. Australia is procuring the aircraft through a government-
to-government agreement. 
During 2012, this project signed the long lead acquisition contract 
for Australia’s first two JSF aircraft. Production of aircraft 
components has commenced to support delivery to the United 
States Pilot Training Centre in early 2014. Full contract signature 
(known as definitisation) has been delayed and it not expected to 
occur until mid-2013, however this is not expected to impact the 
2014 delivery. 
In the 2012-2013 budget, the Australian Government confirmed its 
commitment to the first two JSF aircraft but deferred the 
acquisition of the subsequent 12 aircraft by two years. This 
decision was taken to maintain alignment with the United States 
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Program which has recently deferred the acquisition of 179 
aircraft.28 
7.40 The Committee received an update on the JSF project from senior Defence 
officials. This update focused particularly on the Committee’s three key 
areas of concern: cost, schedule and capability. 
Cost 
7.41 The Committee’s Review of the Defence Annual Report 2010-2011 found that 
cost estimates had increased throughout the life of the JSF project, and 
flagged this as a particular issue of concern for the project.29 
7.42 At a public hearing, Defence advised the Committee that the JSF would be 
delivered within budget: 
From a cost perspective, the approved AIR 6000 phase 2A/B stage 
1—that is, the “first 14 aircraft”—remains within budget. The 
unapproved AIR 6000 2A and 2B stage 2—that is, the “next 58 
aircraft”—remains within its Defence Capability Plan provision.30 
7.43 Furthermore, Defence told the Committee that costs were expected to 
decrease through the life of the project, as production increased: 
There is now strong alignment between the aircraft acquisition 
cost estimates from the independent US Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation Office, the US F-35A Joint Program Office, 
and the Australian New Air Combat Capability Project Office. 
However, the aircraft costs are sensitive to US and partner nation 
purchase profiles. The actual costs for each successive low-rate 
initial production lot continue to be below the US congressional 
estimates. Our first two aircraft are expected to be around, or less 
than, the $130 million estimate that Defence has had since before 
2011. Overall, in 2012 dollars and exchange rate at A$1.03 to US 
dollars, 72 F35As are expected to cost an average of A$83.0 
million—unit recurring flyaway cost—if ordered in the 2018-19 to 
2023-24 time frame.31 
7.44 It was also noted by Defence that the figures it estimated independently 
are consistent with US Congressional cost estimates: 
The latest official US congressional F-35A cost estimates, sourced 
from the publicly available Selected Acquisition Report of 2011, 
 
28  Defence Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 169. 
29  Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Review of the Defence Annual 
Report 2010-2011, p. 81. 
30  Vice Adm. Jones, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 16 May 2013, p. 7. 
31  Vice Adm. Jones, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 16 May 2013, p. 7. 
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are consistent with the Australian estimates and indicate the cost 
of the F-35A—unit recurring flyaway cost—reducing from a price 
of about $130 million in US then dollars for aircraft delivered in 
2014 reducing over time down to about $82 million in US then 
dollars for aircraft delivered in the 2020 time frame.32 
7.45 Defence also discussed the likely sustainment costs, noting that while they 
are currently high, they are likely to decrease over time: 
The sustainment costs are high but reducing, and we should see 
further refinement of these costs now that the F-35A has been 
fielded at several units in the US. This area is a particular focus of 
the US JSF Program Office at present, who have been 
implementing initiatives such as improving the supportability of 
high-value and high-usage aircraft components; opening up 
greater competition for sustainment work; and further developing 
programs to reduce the cost of ownership of F-35A support 
equipment.33 
Schedule 
7.46 In its review of the previous Defence Annual Report, the Committee found 
that while Defence and Lockheed Martin were positive about future 
developments, the schedule for the delivery of working JSFs had slipped 
considerably since the inception of the project.34 
7.47 Defence provided the Committee with an update on the schedule for the 
delivery of the JSF to Australia: 
Following the re-baselining of the program by the US Joint 
Program Office, in 2010-11, the program has stabilised and the 
manufacturer is meeting its key milestones. Technical problems 
with systems such as the helmet mounted display system are 
being addressed. We now have a greater level of confidence that 
the program will deliver the required capability by 2020. We have 
reached this view based on three independent reviews conducted 
by Defence. These consist of two software focussed reviews using 
the schedule compliance risk assessment methodology, or 
SCRAM, and also a further DMO-led review that was independent 
of the Project Team, in March/April 2013. These reviews have 
confirmed the assessment made by the new Program Executive 
 
32  Vice Adm. Jones, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 16 May 2013, p. 7. 
33  Vice Adm. Jones, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 16 May 2013, p. 7. 
34  Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Review of the Defence Annual 
Report 2010-2011, p. 82. 
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Officer, Lieutenant General Bogdan, to the Defence subcommittee 
during his briefing at Avalon, and in his April 2013 testimony to 
the US congress, that the program is likely to deliver the threshold 
capability needed for an Australian IOC in 2020, based on block 3i 
of the aircraft software. Defence assesses a medium risk for the 
delivery of the software capabilities needed to meet the Australian 
IOC requirements in 2020.35 
7.48 Specifically, Defence told the Committee that: 
It is now less than two years before the first two Australian F-35A 
aircraft are delivered, and seven years before the Initial Operating 
Capability, or IOC, of the F-35A in the Royal Australian Air Force. 
[…] 
The first two Australian F-35A aircraft are on track for delivery in 
the United States in late 2014 and will be used for training the first 
Australian pilots at Luke Air Force Base from 2015. Production 
ramp up from 35 to 100-plus F-35A aircraft and engines per 
annum presents a challenge, but the F-35A Joint Program Office 
and the recent DMO-led review assess that it is achievable. 
Lockheed Martin and Pratt and Whitney appear to have the 
resources and expertise to deliver the system development and 
demonstration program and hence achieve an Australian IOC of 
2020. 36 
7.49 Furthermore, a recent independent, DMO-led review found that ‘the F-
35A, in a block 3F configuration, together with its weapons and support 
systems, is likely to be ready to meet an Australian IOC schedule’.37 
7.50 Nonetheless, Defence flagged some potential risk areas in terms of 
schedule: 
From a schedule perspective, software remains a key risk; 
however, the risk appears to be reducing. The block 2B release is 
expected to be delivered to the fleet in mid-2015, and block 3I in 
2016, representing about a four-year schedule buffer to the 
planned Australian IOC of 2020. 
The independent DMO SCRAM review assessed about 11 months 
of schedule risk in the block 3F software. This assessment appears 
valid with about three months slip now forecast by the US JSF 
Program Office. The block 3F fleet release is planned for the third 
quarter of 2017, but could be as late as mid-2018 if the risk is 
 
35  Vice Adm. Jones, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 16 May 2013, p. 6. 
36  Vice Adm. Jones, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 16 May 2013, pp. 6 and 7. 
37  Vice Adm. Jones, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 16 May 2013, p. 6. 
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realised. Defence will have better idea of fleet release date for 
block 3F after the block 3 critical design review in mid-2013.38 
Capability 
7.51 In its Review of the Defence Annual Report 2010-2011, the Committee 
received conflicting evidence on whether the JSF would offer the type of 
capabilities needed to maintain Australia’s regional air superiority, 
particularly in light of the fact that other nations are currently in the 
process of developing fifth generation fighter jets.39 
7.52 Defence offered the Committee an overview of the capability that would 
be offered by the JSF: 
The F-35A, as a 5th generation strike fighter, will provide 
Australia the capability to succeed in the air across the spectrum of 
conflict. It will bring to the fight a degree of networking that is a 
force multiplier for airborne forces, as well as for land and 
maritime forces. The F-35A will be able to operate and win in very 
high threat environments where most other fighters will struggle. 
Very importantly, it is at the start of its operational life and will be 
able to evolve and improve over decades as the threat evolves.40 
7.53 Defence elaborated on the results of the testing that had been conducted 
so far, noting that the JSF will meet requirements upon IOC: 
Of course, with only 35 per cent of flight testing of the F-35A 
complete, and ground fatigue testing of the F-35A just entering the 
second life of testing, there is still the potential for issues to 
emerge. The Block 2B/3i configuration of the F-35A aircraft is 
assessed to be at least as capable as the Classic Hornet in the 
priority IOC roles and will meet the threshold requirements for 
IOC. At this time, all planned capability is expected to be fielded 
in the Block 2B/31 configuration, but there are several 'drops' of 
Block 2B software to be delivered in the next few months. Some 
capability features of the block 3F software may potentially be 
deferred because of the limited budget and schedule available to 
the F-35A System Development and Demonstration program.41 
7.54 Nonetheless, Defence noted that risks to capability do exist, particularly in 
the area of the weapons being designed for use of the JSF: 
 
38  Vice Adm. Jones, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 16 May 2013, p. 7. 
39  Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Review of the Defence Annual 
Report 2010-2011, p. 82. 
40  Vice Adm. Jones, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 16 May 2013, p. 6. 
41  Vice Adm. Jones, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 16 May 2013, p. 6. 
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Maritime strike capability is a high-capability priority for 
Australia, and also is a very high US Department of Defense 
priority for block 4A, planned for release to service in the 2020-21 
timeframe. Defence assess a medium risk that the implementation 
of the Joint Stand-Off Weapon, or JSOW C-1 maritime strike 
weapon, could be delayed to beyond the planned F-35A final 
operating capability date of 2023. This risk will be reassessed once 
the final block 4A content and priorities are confirmed in around 
September 2013 and advised as a part of the AIR 6000 phase 
2A/2B second-pass consideration to government.42 
7.55 Additionally, the large volumes of data were posing potential risks in 
regard to capability: 
A high risk remains in the area of generating a suitable mission 
data load for the F-35A at IOC. The mission data load contains 
threat parameters, weapons information and other mission data. 
Ways of mitigating this risk are being investigated, including the 
sourcing of an initial mission data load from the United States.43 
7.56 The Committee questioned Defence about the technical problems with the 
new helmet mounted display, requesting more detail on what the 
problems were and how they were being addressed. Defence responded at 
length: 
They have been conducting a series of flight tests purely devoted 
to exploring the issues with the helmet mount display system and 
also some of the fixes that they have been putting into the helmet 
mounted display to improve its performance. That testing has just 
been completed and they are now finalising the analysis of it. I will 
give you an initial readout on what the analysis is indicating there. 
As you are well aware there is a dual path on the helmet. We 
currently have the VSI Gen II helmet. The VSI Gen III helmet, 
which will have an improved low-light night vision capability will 
be coming in about 2015 and that will then take over. We will no 
longer have the VSI Gen II. We will go to an all VSI Gen III helmet. 
You are well aware that the other path is a BAE helmet that has a 
night vision goggle arrangement attached to it as an interim 
helmet and as an alternate helmet to the VSI helmet. At the 
moment both paths are being progressed but of course the flight 
testing was all about the VSI Gen II helmet. 
 
42  Vice Adm. Jones, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 16 May 2013, pp. 6-7. 
43  Air Vice Marshal Osley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 16 May 2013, p. 7. 
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I think you are across the issues but I will briefly cover them. 
Alignment is a key one. You hop into the aircraft and on occasion 
the helmet display may not be aligned with the earth. That 
requires you to get out of the aircraft and have it realigned on the 
ground. They are working on a proposal to have that, whereby 
you in fact fine-tune that prior to getting in the aeroplane; the pilot 
can do it as part of his normal checkout procedures. At the 
moment you have to return the helmet and basically go back and 
have it adjusted in the workshop. They are making it so that it is 
pilot-adjustable. 
The next one is green glow, and that is a factor of the design of the 
helmet, using liquid crystal displays. It implies that there is a 
whole lot of extraneous light that is coming in at night around the 
display. Even though it is noted by a few of the test pilots it is not 
considered an operationally significant issue for them and they 
can overcome that one. 
The third one is jitter. There were in excess of 35 flight tests; I 
believe there were 38 by the time I had been to Edwards, and there 
were more being planned. The initial results were that they were 
seeing positive improvements from the modifications that had 
been made. So, they had adjustments to the software to counteract 
the jitter, and in the pre-jitter software the pilot considered that it 
was acceptable but that it would require some workarounds and 
some compensation operationally. The post-modification ones for 
the anti-jitter in the software were showing significant 
improvement. That is all I could get out of them at the time, from 
the commander there. 
The fourth issue is distributed aperture system latency—that is, 
the display has a lag in it. That lag has proven in the test flights to 
not be significant, so it is no major concern. It is expected to meet 
United States Air Force operational requirements. They have 
tested it and measured it and the USAF is now considering that 
data, but it is looking good. 
The final one is the night vision camera. The Generation II helmet 
is not compliant in its night vision capability, and that is an issue 
not so much for the USAF—it can achieve their operational 
requirements—but for the US Marine Corps, in particular for fine 
motor skills of landing on the deck of an landing helicopter dock 
and the fine motor skills involved in air refuelling off KC-130s at 
night doing the probe refuelling. It is a problem both with the 
amount of resolution you have and with the location of the 
camera, as you are aware. That will be fixed in the Generation III 
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helmet by using a better system, and they are working on that. 
And in the interim of course the US Marine Corps are assessing 
whether it is operationally acceptable to go to IOC in 2015 with it, 
noting that they also have the alternate helmet as the backup at 
this time.44 
Committee comment 
7.57 The Committee is encouraged by the update on the JSF project provided 
by Defence. It is pleased to see that, since the re-baselining in 2010-2011, 
the project has been meeting its objectives particularly in terms of cost and 
schedule. 
7.58 While some concerns around capability do still exist, the Committee notes 
Defence’s confidence that these risks can be managed. The Committee 
notes that many of the key areas of risk in regard to capability are actually 
still under development. Thus, it cautions that a close watch must be kept 
on these aspects of the program. 
7.59 The Committee resolves to continue to seek updates on the JSF project in 
future reviews of the Defence Annual Report, so that it can stay up to date 
on current and emerging areas of risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
Hon Joel Fitzgibbon MP 
Chair 
 
 
44  Air Vice Marshal Osley, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 16 May 2013, pp. 9-10. 
  
 
Supplementary Remarks – Dr Dennis Jensen 
MP 
Despite the confidence displayed by the Department of Defence, I am not 
confident that the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will be able to deliver the capabilities 
promised within schedule and cost parameters. 
This belief is well-founded and carefully considered, and is based on my 
observations of the JSF project over the last decade. For instance, in regard to the 
delivery schedule, former Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) Air Chief Marshal 
Angus Houston told the Parliament in 2004 that ‘the expectation is they will begin 
arriving in Australia in 2012’. In 2005 he stated that jets would begin to arrive in 
2012. Despite these assurances, Australia is yet to take delivery of its first two 
aircraft, and Defence advised the Committee in the course of this review that 
Australia is ‘less than two years away’ from receiving its first two aircraft.1  
However, current defence plans have these aircraft remaining in the USA for some 
years! 
Furthermore, in 2007, initial operation capability (IOC) was to be achieved by 
2014-2015. By 2011, Air Vice Marshal Osley was informing the Parliament that IOC 
would be achieved in 2018.2 In 2013, Vice Admiral Jones informed the Committee 
that ‘the program is likely to deliver the threshold capability needed for an 
Australian IOC in 2020’.3 As we can see, the slippage in schedule has been 
considerable over the life of the project, and there is no reason to believe the 
situation might improve given more recent disclosures in the USA.  
Schedule is not the only area where estimates made by Defence and Lockheed 
Martin on which Australia’s decisions have been based have proven to be 
 
1  Dr Dennis Jensen, House of Representatives Hansard, 13 February 2013, p. 163. 
2  Dr Dennis Jensen, House of Representatives Hansard, 13 February 2013, p. 163. 
3  Vice Admiral Jones, Australian Defence Force, Transcript, 16 May 2013, p. 6. 
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incorrect. The cost of the JSF has also been repeatedly revised throughout the life 
of the project. In 2004, Air Marshal Houston stated that the flyaway cost would be 
about $45 Million per aircraft. By 2007 Air Commodore Harvey was estimating 
‘approximately $55 Million’ on average. By 2008, Dr Gumley of the Defence 
Materiel Organisation noted that he would be surprised if the cost was over $75 
Million (in 2008 dollars at an exchange rate of 0.92). By June 2010 the US had 
revised its cost estimate to $133 Million per jet.4 In 2013, Defence told the 
Committee that Australia would pay $130 Million for its initial two jets, with this 
reducing to $82 Million by around 2020.5 
Interestingly in 2006-2007, the  independent think tank, Air Power Australia 
(APA) produced an estimate, based on detailed cost modelling, of between $136 
and $176 Million for the F-35A JSF across the then planned production program. 
The APA cost modelling in 2006-2007 also projected that the aircraft unit price 
Australia would be required to pay for the planned purchases of F-35A CTOL 
variant aircraft would almost certainly be around $219.5 Million if not more, 
particularly for getting fully operational aircraft on the flight line in Australia. 
In 2009, the Australian Government appropriated some $3.2 Billion of public 
funds for the purchase of the first tranche of 14 F-35A JSF aircraft from which 
funds have been committed under contract for the two aircraft mentioned above. 
This equates to a cost figure of $228.57 Million per aircraft but still leaves those 
aircraft in the USA. 
The APA estimates have turned out to be far more accurate than those presented 
by either Lockheed Martin, the JSF Program Office or our own Department of 
Defence. Nonetheless, APA has been consistently, repeatedly and, as the data and 
facts now show, falsely denigrated and defamed by Defence, and not only on cost.  
In regard to APA’s analysis of the capabilities, and particularly the aerodynamic 
performance offered by the JSF, in 2012 Air Vice Marshal Osley told the 
Committee that it was ‘inconsistent with years of detailed analysis undertaken by 
Defence, the JSF Program Office, Lockheed Martin and the eight other partner 
nations.’  Air Vice Marshal Osley claimed that APA’s analysis was ‘basically 
flawed’ due to ‘incorrect assumptions’ based on a ‘lack of knowledge of the 
classified F-35 performance information’.6 
This is inconsistent with the findings of the most recent report of the Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E).7 The latest DOT&E report on the JSF 
 
4  Dr Dennis Jensen, House of Representatives Hansard, 13 February 2013, p. 163. 
5  Vice Admiral Jones, Transcript, 16 May 2013, p. 7. 
6  Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Review of the Defence Annual 
Report 2010-2011, p. 78. 
7  The Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation website, DoD Programs: F-35Joint 
Strike Fighter, viewed 24 June 2013,  
<http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2012/pdf/dod/2012f35jsf.pdf>.  
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demonstrates that APA’s analyses of the performance of the JSF, much like the 
results of their analysis of the cost of the JSF,   were correct from the outset.   
For instance, over the past decade or so, both Lockheed Martin and Defence have 
waxed lyrical before the Australian Parliament (and elsewhere) about the fighter 
performance of the JSF, claiming it to be a ‘9g fighter aircraft with comparable 
fighter performance to the F-16 and F/A-18 legacy aircraft’. 
However, in 2006, APA’s analysis projected that the F-35A variant of the JSF 
would struggle to sustain 4.7 g when attempting to turn at 15,000 feet, when the 
specification of the JSF (the Joint Operational Requirements Document or JORD) 
required the F-35A to be able to sustain a 6.0g turn as the target Objective 
Specification under these conditions, with a bare minimum acceptable Threshold 
Specification of 5.3 g. Furthermore, APA calculated that the F-35A would take 
more than 60 seconds to accelerate from 0.8 Mach to 1.2 Mach at 30,000 feet, while 
the JORD had set a target Objective Specification of less than 40 seconds with the 
bare minimum acceptable Threshold Specification to be, at most, 55 seconds. 
Failure to meet the bare minimum Threshold level of any specification means the 
design fails to meet specification. 
According to the 2012 DOT&E report, the JSF program office ‘announced an 
intention to change performance specifications for the F-35A, reducing turn 
performance from 5.3 to 4.6 sustained g’s. Furthermore, the JSF program office 
also sought an increase of eight seconds on the acceleration bare minimum 
acceptable Threshold level specification, from 55 seconds to 63 seconds.8 Crucially, 
these requested changes accord exactly with the analysis conducted by APA in 
2006-2007. This, put simply, refutes the statement made by Air Vice Marshal Osley 
that APA’s analysis is ‘basically flawed’. 
Since it is said a picture is worth a thousand words, the following summary of the 
APA advice to Defence, successive Defence Ministers, and successive Parliaments 
in relation to the aero/propulsive performance of the JSF aircraft is provided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8  The Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation website, DoD Programs: F-35Joint 
Strike Fighter, viewed 24 June 2013,  
<http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2012/pdf/dod/2012f35jsf.pdf>. 
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Tom Burbage, the Lockheed Martin Vice President and JSF Program Integration 
General Manager, on 20 March 2012, stated ‘the airplane will continue to be well 
in excess of its basic requirement. The airplane is meeting all of the other 
requirements today’, which is clearly contradicted by the DOT&E report and also 
a July 2009 Aviation Week and Space Technology article by Andy Nativi ‘F-35 Air 
Combat Skills Analyzed’ that stated the acceleration time from Mach 0.8 to 1.2 at 
30,000 ft was 61 seconds, and sustained turn was 4.95g at 15,000 ft.9 This clearly 
demonstrates that the aircraft was not reaching its performance requirements, and 
that the data was available as early as 2009, preceding the evidence given by 
Burbage. Burbage also stated that: ‘The STOL weight has been very stable and the 
airplane is meeting all of its performance requirements’. 
In response to a speech I gave in Feb 2013, Burbage wrote a letter to the 
Committee10 attempting to justify his assertions. On APA’s analysis of 
 
9       F-35 Air Combat Skills Analyzed by Andy Nativi.                                                                                                                                                           
www.aviationweek.com/aw/jsp_includes/articlePrint.jsp?... 
10  Letter to Committee by Mr. Tom Burbage, 26 February 2013 CTB: tb: 13-003 
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aerodynamic performance (which were proven correct by the DOT&E Report and 
the JPO request of the JROC to reduce the specifications as stated previously for 
turn and acceleration) he claimed that ‘Air Vice Marshal Osley is correct in his 
assessment that APA’s criticisms of the F-35’s aerodynamic performance is 
inconsistent with years of detailed analysis undertaken by Defence, the JSF 
Program Office, Lockheed Martin and eight other partner nations’. One cannot 
have too much confidence in all of this ‘consensus’ analysis given that the flight 
test program has shown them to be wrong, yet a small non-profit organisation, 
comprising mostly highly experienced engineers, without access to the much 
vaunted ‘classified data’, has been proven correct repeatedly. 
Lockheed Martin CEO Marilyn Hewson, when asked to respond whether her 
company fully supported the claims made by Mr. Burbage in both testimony and 
correspondence, attempted to deflect attention away from the key point, by 
making points that were irrelevant to the specifics of the incorrect information Mr. 
Burbage provided.11 She also tried to explain away the performance contradictions 
by rationalising that Mr. Burbage was only talking about the JSF KPP’s, whereas 
this was never stated by Mr. Burbage, either in his original testimony, nor his 
subsequent communication, responding to my speech of Feb 2013. 
Performance specifications are not the only area where the Committee has 
received evidence from Defence and Lockheed Martin that is directly contradicted 
by the DOT&E report. At a public hearing in 2012, Lockheed Martin told the 
Committee that weight was not an issue in the JSF project. Mr. Burbage informed 
the Committee that only the F-35B variant was sensitive to increases in weight, 
and that the F-35A and F-35C were ‘several thousand pounds away from the first 
compromise of the performance requirements.’12 
Of note here is the several thousand pounds of margin, and the statement of 
‘performance requirements’, where the A-model only has one performance KPP, 
that being range. If Ms. Hewson were correct that Mr. Burbage, in terms of 
performance was specifically speaking of performance KPP’s, then there is only 
one! 
Once again, Mr. Burbage’s testimony is contradicted by the DOT&E report, where 
it is stated ‘The latest F-35A weight status report from November 2012 showed the 
estimated weight of 29,098 pounds to be within 273 pounds (0.94 percent) of the 
projected maximum weight needed to meet technical performance required per 
contract specifications in January 2015.’ This is hardly ‘several thousand pounds of 
margin’. Mr. Burbage, in response to my speech, once again states ‘The F-35 has 
significant weight margins in the F-35A and C.’ Once again, Mr. Burbage knows at 
 
11  Letter to Committee by Ms. Marilyn A. Hewson, April 16, 2013 
12  Mr Tom Burbage, Lockheed Martin, Transcript, 20 March 2012, p. 7. 
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this stage of the DOT&E report, as he referred to it in this communication, but 
persists with the incorrect weight margin. 
Ms. Hewson attempts to obfuscate by stating in her letter that ‘In reference to 
“margin”, the DOT&E report accurately stated the weight margin that then existed 
against the internal weight design target.’ As can be seen from the direct quote 
from the DOT&E report, this is clearly not the case, it is the weight margin to the 
aircraft not meeting its technical performance. 
Of major concern is that, during the recent live fire tests at the Navy Test Centre at 
China Lake in the US, the F-35 demonstrated serious design problems. Burbage, in 
his Feb 2013 communication to the Committee makes a further incorrect 
statement. He stated ‘The F-35 has unprecedented survivability features 
incorporated in its basic design, a fact which is being verified in live fire testing at 
the Navy Test Center in China Lake. Certain equipment was removed from the F-
35 in the early design phase as it was deemed unnecessary redundancy to other 
installed systems’. This claim was in response, again, to my speech of Feb 2013.  
This statement is completely at odds with the DOT&E report which states ‘The 
program’s most recent vulnerability assessment showed that the removal of 
fueldraulic fuses, the PAO shutoff valve, and the dry bay fire suppression 
[system], also removed in 2008, results in the F-35 not meeting the Operational 
Requirements Document (ORD) requirement to have a vulnerability posture better 
than analogous legacy aircraft.’ It is clear that 2008 is not ‘in the early design 
phase’, and the aircraft certainly does not have unprecedented design features 
when it cannot even match the vulnerability of current fighter to hostile weapons 
fire. 
Further, Burbage does not state the correct reason for the removal of these mission 
critical safety features. He simply states ‘deemed unnecessary’. The DOT&E report 
states ‘In 2008, the JSF Executive Steering Board (JESB) directed the removal of the 
PAO shutoff valves from the F-35 design to reduce aircraft weight by 2 pounds.’ 
Also ‘As a result of the weight reduction initiative, the JESB directed the removal 
of fueldraulic fuses from the production design in 2008 to provide a weight saving 
of 9 pounds’. So Burbage is incorrect in stating the survivability of the aircraft to 
ballistic damage, is incorrect in stating the reason for the removal of the 
equipment, and it is clear that his claim of significant weight margins, of around 
‘several thousand pounds’, is completely false given that the aircraft is 
significantly more vulnerable than it should be, for a saving of a mere 11 pounds 
of weight.13 
In light of this reduction in performance specifications and the increase in 
vulnerability, both incurred to meet weight requirements, there is cause for major 
concern. Essentially, the revised performance specifications place the JSF on par 
with legacy fighters such as the long retired Vietnam era F-4 Phantom, which is 
 
13  For comparison, 11 pounds is the weight of a typical housecat. 
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currently more than 50 years old by design. Furthermore, the JSF is unable to 
achieve the JORD requirement to have vulnerability to ballistic damage that was 
better than legacy fighters. 
I have serious questions and deep concerns about how both Defence and the 
prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, might expect the F-35 JSF to credibly compete 
with other, highly capable, Russian and Chinese fighter jets currently being 
developed to compete with the far more capable F-22 Raptor.14 In light of these 
concerns, it is my view that Australia should immediately reconsider its decision 
to purchase the F-35 JSF.  
In conclusion, we might reflect on the extent to which we, the Parliament of 
Australia, have allowed this situation to develop, by repeatedly accepting 
evidence from Defence and their prime contractors, which is clearly at odds with 
reality and irrefutable material hard fact. Every time we accept evidence which is 
either of dubious quality, or intentionally false, we reinforce these inappropriate 
and unlawful behaviours by Defence and their contractors. I am reminded of 
Jackman's famous statement ‘In God we trust. All others must bring data.’15 
 
 
 
Dr Dennis Jensen MP 
  
 
14  There is ample unclassified public data on these new Russian and Chinese aircraft, including 
footage of demonstration flights, which clearly shows these aircraft were designed and built 
from the outset to compete against the F-22. 
15  Professor Simon Jackman accurately predicted the electoral victory of Barack Obama in 
November, 2012, by scientifically analysing polling data. 
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